爱思英语编者按:宗派主义,指党内存在的一种以宗派利益为出发点的思想和行为,是封建宗派思想、资产阶级、小资产阶级思想在组织上的表现。主要表现为:在个人与党的关系上,把个人放在第一位,把党放在第二位,向党闹独立性;在组织上,任人唯亲,在同志中拉拉扯扯,把资产阶级的庸俗作风搬进党里来;在党内关系上,只强调局部利益,只要民主,不要集中,不遵守个人服从组织、少数服从多数、下级服从上级、全党服从中央的民主集中制原则,进行无原则的派别斗争;在和党外人士的关系上,妄自尊大,骄傲自满,不尊重人家,不学习人家的长处,不愿和人家合作等。

The breakdown of Arab states
阿拉伯国家的崩溃
The war within
内部之争
 
Europe and America made mistakes, but the misery of the Arab world is caused mainly by its own failures
欧洲和美国犯下了错误,但是,阿拉伯世界之悽惨的主要原因在于它自身的失败。
 
WHEN Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot secretly drew their lines on the map of the Levant to carve up the Ottoman empire in May 1916, at the height of the first world war, they could scarcely have imagined the mess they would set in train: a century of imperial betrayal and Arab resentment; instability and coups; wars, displacement, occupation and failed peacemaking in Palestine; and almost everywhere oppression, radicalism and terrorism.
 
马克·赛克斯爵士与弗朗索瓦·乔治-皮科在一战高峰的1916年5月秘密地在黎凡特地上划定边界以瓜分奥斯曼帝国时,他们几乎不可能想象到他们将造成的混乱:一个世纪的帝国之背叛和阿拉伯之憎恨;不稳定和政变;巴勒斯坦的战争,取代,占领和失败的和平努力;以及几乎是遍地存在的压迫、激进主义和恐怖主义。
 
In the euphoria of the uprisings in 2011, when one awful Arab autocrat after another was toppled, it seemed as if the Arabs were at last turning towards democracy. Instead their condition is more benighted than ever. Under Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt is even more wretched than under the ousted dictator, Hosni Mubarak. The state has broken down in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. Civil wars rage and sectarianism is rampant, fed by the contest between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The jihadist “caliphate” of Islamic State (IS), the grotesque outgrowth of Sunni rage, is metastasising to other parts of the Arab world.
 
在2011年起义的狂喜中,当可怕的阿拉伯独裁者一个接一个地被推翻之际,阿拉伯人似乎终于在转向民主。相反,他们的境况却是前所未有的黑暗。在阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西(Abdelfattah al Sisi) 治下,埃及甚至比在被赶下台的独裁者胡斯尼·穆巴拉克( Hosni Mubarak)治下还要民不聊生。国家已经在伊拉克、叙利亚和也门分崩离析。受伊朗和沙特角力的影响,内战四起,宗派主义猖獗。逊尼派怒火的丑陋产物——圣战者的伊斯兰国“哈里发”正在向阿拉伯世界的其他地区扩散。
 
Bleak as all this may seem, it could become worse still. If the Lebanese civil war of 1975-90 is any gauge, the Syrian one has many years to run. Other places may turn ugly. Algeria faces a leadership crisis; the insurgency in Sinai could spread to Egypt proper; chaos threatens to overwhelm Jordan; Israel could be drawn into the fights on its borders; low oil prices are destabilising Gulf states; and the proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran might lead to direct fighting.
 
荒凉凋敝如此,似乎可能无以复加。但是,这种情况仍可能进一步恶化。如果说1975-1990年黎巴嫩内战是一把标尺,叙利亚内战还要打许多年。其他地方可能变得丑陋不堪。阿尔及利亚面临一场领导危机;西奈半岛的叛乱可能扩散至埃及全境;混乱可能淹没约旦;以色列可能被拖进边界战火;低油价正在动摇海湾国家;伊朗和沙特间的代理人冲突可能导致直接交战。
 
All this is not so much a clash of civilisations as a war within Arab civilisation. Outsiders cannot fix it—though their actions could help make things a bit better, or a lot worse. First and foremost, a settlement must come from Arabs themselves.
 
所有这一切,与其说是一场文明的冲突,不如说是阿拉伯文明内部的一场战争。局外人不可能扭转乾坤——尽管他们的行动可能有助于些许的缓和,也有可能令其急剧恶化。首要的是,和解必须来自阿拉伯人自己。

Beware of easy answers
警惕简单的答案
 
Arab states are suffering a crisis of legitimacy. In a way, they have never got over the fall of the Ottoman empire. The prominent ideologies—Arabism, Islamism and now jihadism—have all sought some greater statehood beyond the frontiers left by the colonisers. Now that states are collapsing, Arabs are reverting to ethnic and religious identities. To some the bloodletting resembles the wars of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Others find parallels with the religious strife of Europe's Thirty Years War in the 17th century. Whatever the comparison, the crisis of the Arab world is deep and complex. Facile solutions are dangerous. Four ideas, in particular, need to be repudiated.
 
阿拉伯国家正在遭受一场合法性危机。从一定程度上来说,他们从未从奥斯曼帝国的倒塌中恢复过来。几大意识形态——阿拉伯主义、伊斯兰主义,再加上现在的圣战主义——一直都在寻求某种更大的、超越殖民者遗留下来的边界的国家地位。既然国家正处于崩溃之中,阿拉伯人也在转向种族和宗教认同。对于一些人来说,现在的血腥杀戮类似于上世纪90年代的前南斯拉夫战争。其他人看到的是与17世纪的欧洲三十年战争之宗教冲突的相似之处。无论作何对比,阿拉伯世界的危机都是错综复杂的。肤浅的解决方案是危险的。四种观点尤其需要被否定。
 
First, many blame the mayhem on Western powers—from Sykes-Picot to the creation of Israel, the Franco-British takeover of the Suez Canal in 1956 and repeated American interventions. Foreigners have often made things worse; America's invasion of Iraq in 2003 released its sectarian demons. But the idea that America should turn away from the region—which Barack Obama seems to embrace—can be as destabilising as intervention, as the catastrophe in Syria shows.
 
首先,许多人把乱局归咎于西方大国——从赛克斯-皮科协议到以色列的创建,再到法英1956年对苏伊士运河的收回以及连番的美国干预。外国人经常令局势恶化;美国在2003年对伊拉克的入侵释放出了那里的宗派恶魔。但是,美国应当放弃该地区的观点——即奥巴马似乎要全盘接受的观点——正如叙利亚灾难所示,可能与干预一样破坏稳定。
 
Lots of countries have blossomed despite traumatic histories: South Korea and Poland—not to mention Israel. As our special report sets out, the Arab world has suffered from many failures of its own making. Many leaders were despots who masked their autocracy with the rhetoric of Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine (and realised neither). Oil money and other rents allowed rulers to buy loyalty, pay for oppressive security agencies and preserve failing state-led economic models long abandoned by the rest of the world.
 
许多国家已经开花结果,尽管有着创伤性历史:南韩和波兰,更别提以色列了。正如我们的专题报答所述,阿拉伯世界遭受了许多自身造成的失败。许多领导人都曾是用阿拉伯世界团结一心以及巴勒斯坦解放这样的言辞来掩盖其独裁统治的暴君(而且一直没有认识到这一点)。石油金钱和其他租金纵容了统治者去收买忠诚,资助压迫性的安全机构、维持其摇摇欲坠的、为世界其他地区长久所抛弃的国家经济模式。
 
A second wrong-headed notion is that redrawing the borders of Arab countries will create more stable states that match the ethnic and religious contours of the population. Not so: there are no neat lines in a region where ethnic groups and sects can change from one village or one street to the next. A new Sykes-Picot risks creating as many injustices as it resolves, and may provoke more bloodshed as all try to grab land and expel rivals. Perhaps the Kurds in Iraq and Syria will go their own way: denied statehood by the colonisers and oppressed by later regimes, they have proved doughty fighters against IS. For the most part, though, decentralisation and federalism offer better answers, and might convince the Kurds to remain within the Arab system. Reducing the powers of the central government should not be seen as further dividing a land that has been unjustly divided. It should instead be seen as the means to reunite states that have already been splintered; the alternative to a looser structure is permanent break-up.
 
第二个错误观点是,重新划分阿拉伯国家的边界将创造出与其人口的种族和宗教等高线相吻合的更加稳定的国家。不然:在一个族群和教派能够从一个村庄或一条街道变换到下一个村庄或街道的地区,压根不存在准线。一个新的赛克斯-皮科协议的风险在于,它将制造出与其所解决的同样多的不公正,并且可能因为各方试图攫取土地和驱逐对手而激起更多的杀戮。或许,伊拉克和叙利亚的库尔德人将自行其是:被殖民者否定了国家地位并且受到后来政权压迫的他们,已经在反击伊斯兰国的战斗中中证明自己是不屈不挠的战士。然而,一般来说,去中央化和联邦主义提供的是较好的答案,并且可能说服库尔德人仍旧留在阿拉伯体系之中。减少中央政府的权力不应当被视为对一块已经被不公正平地割裂的土地的进一步割裂。
 
A third ill-advised idea is that Arab autocracy is the way to hold back extremism and chaos. In Egypt Mr Sisi's rule is proving as oppressive as it is arbitrary and economically incompetent. Popular discontent is growing. In Syria Bashar al-Assad and his allies would like to portray his regime as the only force that can control disorder. The contrary is true: Mr Assad's violence is the primary cause of the turmoil. Arab authoritarianism is no basis for stability. That much, at least, should have become clear from the uprisings of 2011.
 
第三个欠考虑的观点认为,阿拉伯独裁政权是抵御极端主义和混乱之道。在埃及,塞西的统治正在证明自己与其专制和经济无能一样的压迫性。民众的不满正在积累。在叙利亚,巴沙尔·阿萨德和他的盟友想把他的政权说成是能够掌控乱局的唯一力量。相反的是正确的:阿萨德的暴力是动荡的主要原因。阿拉伯的独裁专制不是稳定之基石。这起码已经应该因为2011年的起义而变得明确了。
 
The fourth bad argument is that the disarray is the fault of Islam. Naming the problem as Islam, as Donald Trump and some American conservatives seek to do, is akin to naming Christianity as the cause of Europe's wars and murderous anti-Semitism: partly true, but of little practical help. Which Islam would that be? The head-chopping sort espoused by IS, the revolutionary-state variety that is decaying in Iran or the political version advocated by the besuited leaders of Ennahda in Tunisia, who now call themselves “Muslim democrats”? To demonise Islam is to strengthen the Manichean vision of IS. The world should instead recognise the variety of thought within Islam, support moderate trends and challenge extremists. Without Islam, no solution is likely to endure.
 
第四个丑陋的观点是,乱局是伊斯兰教之错。像特朗普和美国的一些保守主义者那样,指责伊斯兰教是问题所在,类似于指责基督教是欧洲的战争和血腥的反犹主义的根源:部分是正确的,但没有什么实际性帮助。这会是哪一种类型的伊斯兰教?是被伊斯兰国所信奉的斩首型?还是正在伊朗衰败的革命国家型?亦或是得到了如今自称是“穆斯林民主制”的突尼斯伊斯兰复兴党领导人支持的政治版本?妖魔化伊斯兰教等于是强化伊斯兰国的摩尼教愿景。国际社会反而应当认清伊斯兰教内部的各个类别,支持温和派,打击极端主义者。没有了伊斯兰教,没有一个解决方案可能持久。

Reform or perish
不改革就灭亡
 
All this means that resolving the crisis of the Arab world will be slow and hard. Efforts to contain and bring wars to an end are important. This will require the defeat of IS, a political settlement to enfranchise Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, and an accommodation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is just as vital to promote reform in countries that have survived the uprisings. Their rulers must change or risk being cast aside. The old tools of power are weaker: oil will remain cheap for a long time and secret policemen cannot stop dissent in a networked world.
 
总之,阿拉伯世界的危机的解决将是缓慢且艰难的。控制并结束战争的努力至关重要。这旧要有伊斯兰国的失败、对伊拉克和叙利亚逊尼派给予选举权的政治解决以及伊朗和沙特的和解。在经历了起义的国家提倡改革也同样关键。这些国家的统治者必须变革,不然就是在冒被一脚踢开的风险。陈旧的权力工具更加虚弱:石油将长期保持廉价,秘密警察不可能在一个网络化了的世界中阻止异见。
 
Kings and presidents thus have to regain the trust of their people. They will need “input” legitimacy: giving space to critics, whether liberals or Islamists, and ultimately establishing democracy. And they need more of the “output” variety, too: strengthening the rule of law and building productive economies able to thrive in a globalised world. That means getting away from the rentier system and keeping cronies at bay.
 
因而,国王和总统们必需重新赢得民众的信任。他们将需要“注入”合法性:给予无论是自由派还是伊斯兰主义者的批评者以空间,并最终建立民主制。同时,他们也需要更多地“输出”多样化:强化法治,构建能够在一个全球化了的世界中繁荣的高效经济体。这意味着铲除寻租者体系,抵御裙带关系。
 
America and Europe cannot impose such a transformation. But the West has influence. It can cajole and encourage Arab rulers to enact reforms. And it can help contain the worst forces, such as IS. It should start by supporting the new democracy of Tunisia and political reforms in Morocco—the European Union should, for example, open its markets to north African products. It is important, too, that Saudi Arabia opens its society and succeeds in its reforms to wean itself off oil. The big prize is Egypt. Right now, Mr Sisi is leading the country to disaster, which would be felt across the Arab world and beyond; by contrast, successful liberalisation would lift the whole region.
 
美国和欧洲不可能强加给这样一种转变。但是,西方具有影响力,能够说服并鼓励阿拉伯统治者推行改革,能够帮助遏制像伊斯兰国这样的恶势力。他们应当从支持突尼斯的新民主和摩洛哥的政治改革着手——例如,欧盟应当对北非商品开放其市场。沙特开放其社会并且成功地进行戒除石油的改革也至关重要。大奖是埃及。如今,塞西正在把这个国家带向灾难,这会被整个阿拉伯世界以及外部世界所认识;相比之下,成功的自由化会提升整个地区。
 
Without reform, the next backlash is only a matter of time. But there is also a great opportunity. The Arabs could flourish again: they have great rivers, oil, beaches, archaeology, youthful populations, a position astride trade routes and near European markets, and rich intellectual and scientific traditions. If only their leaders and militiamen would see it.
 
没有了改革,下一次强烈反弹仅仅是时间问题。但是,机会多多。阿拉伯世界能够再次繁荣:他们有伟大的河流、石油、海岸、考古学、年轻的人口、横跨多条贸易通道和靠近欧洲市场的位置以及丰富的学识和科学传统。只要他们的领导人和军方会看到这一点。