What the Führer means for Germans today

Seventy years after Adolf Hitler's death, how Germans see him is changing
Dec 19th 2015 | Berlin | From the print edition
IN GERMANY, as in the rest of Europe, copyright expires seven decades after the author's year of death. That applies even when the author is Adolf Hitler and the work is “Mein Kampf”. Since 1945, the state of Bavaria has owned the book's German-language rights and has refused to allow its republication. German libraries stock old copies, and they can be bought and sold. But from January 1st no permission will be needed to reprint it.
Those living outside Germany may not immediately grasp the significance of the moment. “Mein Kampf” has always been available in translation and is now just a click away online. But that is not the point. For Germans, the expiry of the copyright has caused hand-wringing and controversy. The question, as they ring in the new year, is not what to do about “Mein Kampf” as it enters the public domain. Rather, it is what Hitler means for Germany today.
“Mein Kampf” is a mix of autobiography and manifesto that Hitler began writing during a rather comfortable prison stay after his failed putsch of 1923. It was first published in two volumes in 1925 and 1926. The title means “My Struggle”, and Hitler certainly struggled with syntax, grammar and style. One contemporary reviewer ridiculed it as “Mein Krampf” (My Cramp). Much of it is dull or incomprehensible today. Some phrases demand parody: “Columbus's eggs lie around by the hundreds of thousands, but Columbuses are met with less frequently.”
《我的奋斗》是一本兼具自传和宣言性质的书,它是希特勒在1923年政变失败后,在一间相当舒服的牢房内开始写作的。它在1925年和1926年首次以两卷本的形式出版。书名 Mein Kampf 的意思是“我的奋斗”,而且希特勒也的确在句法、语法和风格上下足了功夫。一位当代评论家曾经地讥讽地称之为
Mein Krampf (“我的抽风”)。以今天的眼光来看,它的大部分内容枯燥乏味,不可理喻。有些表达需要模仿:“哥伦布的鸡蛋被很多人放置。但是,哥伦布本人的较为经常得到满足。”
Woven into the prose are crude Social Darwinism and anti-Semitism that resonated even beyond Germany, as well as hints of the author's murderous potential. Having been gassed by the British in the first world war, Hitler writes: if some of the “Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas, as happened to hundreds of thousands of our very best German workers in the field, the sacrifice of millions at the front would not have been in vain.”
It is not clear how many Germans read the tome. But after 1933, when Hitler seized power, it became a bestseller. From 1936 some municipalities gave it to newlyweds after their vows, and by the end of the second world war about 13m copies were in print.
After the war it fell to the Americans to decide what to do about the book, because Hitler's last private address, in Munich, was in their sector. The Third Reich was gone and the Federal Republic of Germany would not be born until 1949. So the Americans transferred the rights to the government of Bavaria. It banned printing of the book.
This approach reflected the first post-war phase in the German treatment of Hitler's legacy. The idea was to suppress anything that might tempt the Germans to fall back under his spell. The Allies and the new German government followed a policy of “de-nazification”, under which known Nazis were banned from important positions. But as the cold war unfolded, West Germany was needed as an ally. For lack of alternatives, ministries, courtrooms and schools employed former Nazis again.
In the late 1940s and 1950s Germans avoided discussing Hitler. Many men were returning from captivity. Many women had been raped. People had been displaced, orphaned or widowed. Germans had been both perpetrators and victims, and had no words for their state of mind. Many were traumatised and could not bear to talk about their experiences. They found it psychologically easier to dwell in the present and keep busy with the Wirtschaftswunder, the post-war “economic miracle”. Many still denied the full scale of the Holocaust. According to Thomas Sandkühler, author of “Adolf H.”, a recent biography, a poll in the 1950s found that almost half of West Germans thought Hitler would have been “one of the greatest German statesmen” if he had not started the war.
上世纪40年代末期和50年代,德国人一度避免谈及希特勒。当时,许多男性正在从监禁中返回,许多妇女遭到了强奸。人们背井离乡,家破人忘。那时的德国人,既是施害者也是受害者,心情无法形容。许多人深受伤害,不忍谈及他们的经历。他们发现,活在当下并且忙于Wirtschaftswunder——战后“经济奇迹”,在心理上要更容易一些。许多人仍然否认犹太人大屠杀全面性。据最新传记《阿道夫·H》的作者Thomas Sandkühler,上世纪50年代的一次民调发现,当时,将近一半的西德人认为,要是没有发动战争,希特勒会是“德国最伟大的政治家之一”
A new phase began in the 1960s, after the Israelis captured, tried and executed Adolf Eichmann, a leading Nazi. This made more details of the Holocaust public. Starting in 1963, 22 former SS men were prosecuted in Frankfurt for their crimes in Auschwitz. The Germans were glued to these cases: 20,000 people went to the Frankfurt courtroom during the sessions. For the first time Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coping with the past”) came to kitchen tables, where it split families.
Sons and daughters accused their parents and professors of complicity and rebelled at home and on campus. Their elders retreated into sanitised tales of what they had done or lived through. A husband-and-wife team of psychoanalysts, Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, called this pathology “the inability to grieve” in a book of that title published in 1967. This mired the Germans in an ongoing moral and psychological crisis, they thought.
儿女指责父母和大学教授是同谋犯,反出了家庭和校园;他们的父辈退入了消过毒了的有关他们之前的所做所为和生活经历的故事之中。心理学夫妻搭档亚历山大·米切利希和玛格丽特·米切利希夫妇(Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich)曾在1967年出版的一本同名的书中,称之为“无力悲伤”病理现象。他们认为,这种病理现象令德国人陷入了一种持续的道德和心理危机之中。
Official Germany found two responses. East Germany adopted the fiction that its righteous communists had resisted the “fascists” all along. In effect, it never reckoned with the past. But West Germany accepted its guilt and atoned publicly. It became a pacifist society, often called “post-heroic” in contrast to the Allies' warrior cultures. It also became “post-national”: West Germans rarely flew their flag and barely whispered their anthem at sporting events. The young sought identity either sub-nationally (as Swabians or Bavarians, say) or supra-nationally, as good Europeans.
But starting in the 1970s a pent-up fascination with Hitler began to re-emerge. Two biographies and a documentary came out, and in 1979 Germany aired “Holocaust”, an American television series, which shocked Germans into a new round of soul-searching. Many changed their perceptions in a way that Richard von Weizsäcker, then West Germany's president, expressed in a historic speech in 1985, on the 40th anniversary of Germany's surrender. May 8th 1945 was not the date of Germany's defeat and collapse, he said, but of its liberation.
After reunification in 1990—the formal end of the post-war era—the German public became ravenous for more research. Der Spiegel, a weekly news magazine, featured Hitler on its cover 16 times during the 1990s. A book by an American historian, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, in which he argued that ordinary Germans were “Hitler's Willing Executioners”, became a hit. A museum exhibition about the Wehrmacht, Germany's wartime army, argued that ordinary soldiers (rather than just the SS) had participated in the Holocaust. Germans queued around the block to see it.
在1990年重新统一后——战后时代的正式结束——德国公众变得渴望更多的调查了。在上世纪90年代期间,新闻周刊《明镜》曾经16次把希特勒搬上它的封面,一本由美国历史学家丹尼尔·乔纳·戈德哈根(Daniel Jonah Goldhagen)撰写并指出普通德国人是“希特勒的志愿行刑者”的书风靡一时,一场有关Wehrmacht——德国战时军队——博物馆展览指出,普通士兵(不仅仅是党卫队士兵)曾经参与了犹太人大屠杀。德国人曾经在街上派着长队观看这个展览。
But there was a parallel trend towards what Germans call “Hitler porn” and “Hitler kitsch”. The Führer became a marketing tool. It started in the 1980s when Stern, a magazine, published what it alleged was Hitler's diary, a sensation that turned out to be fake. Since the 1990s the history channel on German television has aired almost nightly documentaries on Hitler's women, henchmen, last days, ailments, table silver or German Shepherd dog (called Blondi). Any footage of the small man with the toothbrush moustache draws an audience. In that way, Hitler has become like sex and violence: bait to sell copies or to grab attention.
但是,与此同时,还存在着一种德国人称之为“希特勒色情”和“希特勒猎奇”的趋势。Führer(元首)成为了一件营销工具。这种趋势始于上世纪80年代。当时,一本名为《明星》的杂志发表了自称是希特勒的日记而轰动一时,但是后来证明这是一份赝品。自上世纪90年代以来,德国电视台的历史频道几乎天天晚上都在播放有关希特勒的女人、私生子、最后的日子、各种疾病、银餐具和(名为Blondi )德国牧羊犬的纪录片。任何有关这个留着小胡子的矮个子的镜头都吸引观众。希特勒以这种方式变成了与性和暴力一样的东西:推销书籍或是吸引注意力的诱饵。
But this fascination also suggests a new distance. Most of the audience, after all, now have no personal recollection of Hitler. This explains another genre: satire. During his lifetime, it was Germany's enemies who parodied Hitler, as in Charlie Chaplin's film of 1940, “The Great Dictator”. But in 1998 Walter Moers became the first German satirist to score a hit with a comic strip, “Adolf, die Nazi-Sau” (“Adolf, the Nazi pig”). Its producer called the character “the greatest pop star we've ever created”.
但是,这种着魔也表明了一种新的距离。毕竟,如今的大多数观众都没有关于希特勒的私人记忆。这就让另一种题材——讽刺——解释得通了。在他的一生中,像在卓别林1940年的电影《大独裁者》中那样夸张地模仿过希特勒的是德国的敌人。但是,瓦尔特·莫尔斯(Walter Moer)在1998年成为了第一位以一部连环漫画——Adolf, die Nazi-Sau (《阿道夫,纳粹猪》)引起轰动的德国讽刺作家。它的出版商称漫画中的人物是“我们迄今所创造的最大的明星。”
The latest bestseller is “Look Who's Back” by Timur Vermes, translated into English this year. Hitler wakes up in today's Berlin near his old bunker. Disoriented at first, he so amuses everybody he meets, including his Turkish dry-cleaner, that he is launched on a meteoric career as a comedian. His hip colleagues are convinced that he is a consummate “messed ekta” (Berlinish-English for method actor) offering a subtle critique of modern media culture.
最新的畅销书是帖木儿·魏穆斯(Timur Vermes)的《看,谁回来了》(Look Who's Back),这本书在今年已被翻译为英语。希特勒在今天的柏林靠近他古老地堡的地方醒了过来。一开始的不知所措,让他逗乐了包括土耳其裔干洗店店员在内的他所见到的每一个人,以至于他身不由己开始了一段作为一名喜剧演员的飞黄腾达的职业生涯。他周围的同事坚信,他是一名能够提供一种微妙的当代媒体文化批评的“messed ekta”(演技派演员)。
For young Germans the Führer has thus receded far enough into the past to seem outlandish and weird rather than potentially seductive. In “Look Who's Back”, he regurgitates inane phrases from “Mein Kampf”, such as: “The titmouse seeks the titmouse, the finch the finch, the stork the stork, the field mouse the field mouse…” But the words and the diction, with its famously rolled “r”, have no effect other than hilarity.
One by one, post-war taboos connected to Hitler are vanishing. Flag-waving is one. A breakthrough occurred in 2006, when Germany hosted the football World Cup. For the first time since the war the black-red-and-gold came out everywhere, draping balconies, prams, cars and bikinis. But so did the flags of the visiting countries, and Germany turned into one big street party. Hosts and visitors perceived it as nothing but fun.
In a poll by YouGov this year, Germans were asked what person or thing they associate with Germany. They named Volkswagen first (awkwardly, given subsequent revelations of its cheating). Then came Goethe and Angela Merkel, the chancellor, next the anthem, the national football team and Willy Brandt, a former chancellor. Hitler ranked a distant seventh at 25%. In the same poll 70% of Germans said they were proud of their country. About as many thought that Germany was a model of tolerance and democracy, and that it was time to stop feeling guilt and shame.
Forever abnormal
And yet 75% also said that Hitler's crimes mean Germany still cannot be a “normal” country and must play a “special international role”. This means that many Germans somehow combine both pride and penance. Attempts to resolve this inner conflict shape much of German culture today, even when the subject ostensibly has nothing to do with Hitler.
Start with Germany's political discourse. In contrast to the French, British and Americans, Germans worry a lot about surveillance by governments, whether foreign or German. The anxiety stems from memories of Hitler's Gestapo (and more recently the East German Stasi). There is also a wide consensus that Germany has a special responsibility towards Israel. Pacifism runs through all mainstream political parties.
Indeed Germany is discomfited by power generally, especially its own. At home and abroad it advocates right over might. Hence its apparent obsession with rules, even to the exasperation of its partners (in the euro crisis, for example). Hence also its reluctance to act like a “hegemon”, as its allies often demand. Asked whether Mrs Merkel is “the most powerful leader in the European Union”, her spokesman replies indignantly: “Those are not the categories in which we think.”
In political style, too, Germany seems to want constantly to prove that it has moved on from Hitler. Germans flocked to Barack Obama when he visited Berlin as a candidate in 2008 in part for his soaring oratory. But they would never accept such rhetoric in their own politicians, for it would remind them of Hitler's demagogic charisma. Led by Mrs Merkel, “the entire German political class uses a kind of sanitised Lego language, snapping together prefabricated phrases made of hollow plastic”, says Timothy Garton Ash, a British Germanophile at Oxford University. “Because of Hitler, the palette of contemporary German political rhetoric is deliberately narrow, cautious and boring.”
在政治风格方面,德国人似乎也是想要不断地证明自己已经远离了希特勒。德国人之所以会在奥巴马2008年以总统候选人身份访问柏林时成群结队地欢迎他,很大一部分是为了他那慷慨激昂的演讲术。但是,他们永远也不会接受他们自己政客的这种高调。因为,这会让他们想起希特勒的那种蛊惑性魅力。牛津大学亲德的英国教授蒂莫西·嘉顿·阿什(Timothy Garton Ash)指出,以默克尔为首的“整个德国政治阶层使用的是一种经过消毒的乐高语言,将各种由中空塑料制成的预制措辞拼接在一起。因为希特勒,当代德国政治语言调色板的狭窄、谨慎和枯燥都是有意的。”
Domestic life is governed by Germany's post-war constitution, which was adopted in 1949 as a direct rejoinder to Hitler's worldview and has become a source of patriotism today. Its first article stipulates that “human dignity shall be inviolable”. This translates into police practices that would count as touchy-feely in America, prisons that resemble low-budget hotels, and one of Europe's most welcoming policies towards asylum-seekers, despite all the strain that this has imposed during the current refugee crisis.
But because of Hitler, the Germans “no longer dare to develop grand visions”, argues Stephan Grünewald, a German psychologist and author of “Germany on the Couch”. They resist getting excited about big ideas lest they succumb again to some obsession. Instead, Germans publicly don a “cool indifference” in an atmosphere of stultifying political correctness. They are willing to back big reforms—as in the country's energy transition to renewables—only when there is no moral ambiguity. Part of them, says Mr Grünewald, still yearns to graduate from the “historical position of world destroyer to that of world saviour”.
但是,德国心理学家、《沙发上的德国人》的作者Stephan Grünewald指出,因为希特勒,德国人“已经不再敢于提出宏大的愿景”。他们抵制为某些大思想而激动,以防再次屈从于某种痴迷。相反,德国人在一种极其单调乏味的政治正确的氛围中,公开地给自己穿上了一件“冷静的漠不关心”的外衣。正如这个国家在向可再生能源转型中所表现的那样,他们只有在没有道德模糊感的情况下,才愿意支持重大的改革。Grünewald称,部分德国人仍旧渴望着完成“从世界摧毁者的历史地位到世界拯救者的历史地位”的转变。
This does not mean that Hitler made today's Germans boring. Official Germany still displays virtues the world considers German, such as punctuality and reliability. But behind this “protective shield”, say psychologists at Rheingold Salon, a market-research firm in Cologne, many Germans adopt highly idiosyncratic lifestyles in everything from hobbies to sex. Contrary to stereotype, Germans are often secret eccentrics.
这并不说,希特勒造就了今天的德国人的枯燥乏味。德国官方仍在展示世界各国认为德国人所应有的那些优秀品质,例如守时和可靠。但是,正如科隆的市场调研机构Rheingold Salon的心理学家所指出的那样,在这面“防御性盾牌”的后面,许多德国人在从个人爱好到性的一切方面都采纳了高度异质化的生活方式。较之成见,德国人在私下里经常都是些怪人。
The hidden Schmerz and Angst
There is, however, an even more intimate domain in which Hitler continues to torment older and middle-aged Germans: their minds. One generation, defined roughly as those born between 1928 and 1947, is called the Kriegskinder (“war children”). The other, born between 1955 and 1970 or so, consists of their children and is called the Kriegsenkel (“war grandchildren”). These terms come from Helmut Radebold, a psychotherapist who is now 80 years old. As a war child he was evacuated from Berlin when it was bombed and then “overrun by the Russians”. At night his mother dug a hole in haystacks, curled up inside and made little Helmut lie on top of her to avoid being found and raped.
然而,有一个更加私人的领域是希特勒仍在折磨德国老年人和中年人的,那就是他们的心灵。大致定义为在1928年到1947年间的出生的一代人被称为Kriegskinder(战争儿童);另一代人大致出生在1955年到1970年之间,由他们的孩子所组成,被称为Kriegsenkel(战争孙辈)。这两个词语来自现年80岁的心理治疗师Helmut Radebold。作为一名战争儿童,在柏林遭到轰炸然后又“被俄国人占领”时,他曾被从这座城市中疏散。当时,一到晚上,他的母亲就会在干草堆中挖一个洞,然后蜷缩在里面,并让小Helmut躺在她上面,以避免被人发现或是遭到强奸。
In the 1980s Mr Radebold was treating men of his generation for various psychological ailments. Gradually, he saw connections to the war, because these Kriegskinder had “never been allowed to grieve”. “I myself became depressed and often cried,” Mr Radebold recalls. “My own history caught up with me.” He began writing books about the phenomenon.
Much of what seems strange today about some older Germans has roots in these repressed memories, he says. Why do these people squirrel away food amid plenty? Why are they scared of fireworks or sirens? Why do some women in nursing homes wail uncontrollably when male carers come to change their nappies at night? As the Kriegskinder age, he says, old traumas resurface.
Their children, the Kriegsenkel, have different problems. As they grew up, their parents were often emotionally frozen. The elders came out of the war in a sedated or numb state from which they never fully emerged, says Sabine Bode, another writer on the topic. This impaired relations with their children, who, by intuiting what must never be said or what was omitted with a sigh, inherited their parents's trauma. Later, as adults, they asked—as Mr Radebold's daughter did—questions such as: Why were you never interested in our little problems? And why do we have nightmares about your firebombings?
他们的孩子——战争孙辈——有着不同的问题。在他们长大的过程中,他们的父母经常是心灵封闭的。这个问题的另一位作者Sabine Bode说,年纪较大的德国人以一种他们永远也不能完全从中摆脱出来的压抑或者麻木的状态走出了战争。这种与他们那些已经觉查到肯定有什么事从未被说出来或是以一声叹息来表达的孩子们之间的受损的关系继承了他们父辈的创伤。后来,作为成年人,他们——像Radebold的女儿那样——问出了这样的问题:为什么你们从不对我们的小问题感兴趣?为什么我们会做有关你们空袭大火的噩梦?
In recent years support groups have formed for the grandchildren of the war. Only about 40% of middle-aged Germans share such “transgenerational” trauma, says Mr Radebold. But much of the stereotypical German angst and yearning for order and stability originates here. Mrs Bode thinks that many of the Kriegsenkel today have “lower life energy”.
As “Mein Kampf” loses its copyright, German society is more complex than ever. One in five Germans today has immigrant roots and thus no family link to Hitler's time. Many of the young know little history and find Hitler alien and fascinating. A few—somewhat more in what used to be East Germany—shout Sieg heil at neo-Nazi rock concerts because they are drawn to Hitler's ability to shock the establishment. Other Germans have complex cocktails of emotions. They are extra-keen to do good—by helping refugees, for example. Yet they remain afraid of themselves and their compatriots.
And so Germany remains vigilant, if not quite paranoid. Most federal states ban licence plates with certain combinations (such as HH 88, code for “Heil Hitler”). An effort is under way to ban a neo-Nazi party called NPD, even though it won a mere 1% in the European elections of 2014.
因而,德国人仍旧保持了警惕性,虽然这种警惕性已经不象原来那样偏执。德国的大多数州都明令禁止带有某种组合的车牌(例如,代表“希特勒万岁” 的号码HH88 )。目前,取缔一个叫做NPD的亲纳粹政党的尝试正在进行,尽管这个政党在2014年的欧洲议会选举中仅仅获得了1%的选票。
Releasing “Mein Kampf” into the public domain was thus never going to be easy. In 2012 Bavaria convened Jewish and Roma representatives in Nuremberg for a discussion. They agreed that Bavaria should fund a scholarly edition to drive new right-wing publications out of the market and demystify the book. The state parliament approved the plan unanimously. A research institute was selected and got to work. But later that year Bavaria's premier, Horst Seehofer, visited Israel, where some victims' groups opposed the plan.
因而,解禁《我的奋斗》并让它进入公共领域从来就不是一件轻松的事情。巴伐利亚州曾于2012年在纽伦堡召集犹太人和罗姆人代表商讨此事。他们当时达成了一致,认为巴伐利亚州应当资助一个学术性的版本,以便把新右翼的版本逐出市场,并揭去罩在这本书上的神秘面纱。州议会匿名通过了这项计划。一个研究机构被选定从事这项工作。但是,当年晚些时候,巴伐利亚州州长Horst Seehofer访问了一些反对这项计划的受害者组织所在的以色列。
Faced with these conflicting attitudes, Bavarian officialdom took fright. In 2013 the state pulled out of the scholarly effort, which now proceeds without official backing. Meanwhile, the justice ministers of the 16 federal states have said that they will continue to prosecute anybody hawking the book for “incitement of the people”.
If a country can ever be said to be good, Germany today can. And yet Germans know that whenever others are angry with them, they will paint a Hitler moustache on posters of their chancellor. Many Germans are fed up with this—with being “blackmailed”, as Bild, the leading tabloid, complained this spring, when Greece unexpectedly brought war reparations into negotiations about bail-outs in the euro crisis. Other Germans, mainly on the left, fret about a new “post-post-nationalism”, as Germany tentatively articulates its self-interest abroad. For most countries, this would count as normal. For Germany, it remains complicated.