THE “lynch” is what the Israeli government, media and man-in-the-street are calling their navy’s interception on May 31st of the six-vessel multi-nation flotilla that was attempting to bring aid to Gaza. And, in Israeli eyes, the victims of the lynch mob were not the pro-Palestinian activists, perhaps nine of them Turkish, who were shot dead in the operation, nor the dozens of others who were injured, but the Israeli commandos who were set upon with clubs and staves when they shimmied down from helicopters onto the deck of the leading vessel, a Turkish pleasure steamer called Mavi Marmara.

5月31日,以色列海军拦截了企图向加沙运送救援物资的六艘多国小型船只,该行为被以色列政府、媒体和普通民众称为“私刑”。在以色列看来,受此次私刑暴民迫害的并非亲巴勒斯坦活动分子——其中大约有九名土耳其人在行动中被袭生亡,也非其余受伤的若干人等,而是以色列突击队员,他们在从直升机降至土耳其领航船只“马维马尔马拉” 号(Mavi Marmara)甲板时遭到棍棒袭击.

One popular columnist extended the “lynch” metaphor to the United Nations Security Council where, on June 1st, member-states unanimously condemned “those acts which resulted in the loss of at least ten civilians” and called for a “prompt, impartial, credible and transparent investigation”. American diplomats had laboured to mitigate much tougher language proposed by Turkey and others. But the Obama administration’s failure to cast a blanket veto on any deprecation of Israel is depicted in Israel almost as a betrayal. The head of Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service, warned a Knesset committee that Israel was becoming “less of a strategic asset” to the United States (for an American view see article).

联合国安理会延用了由一著名专栏作家使用的“私刑”这一比喻。6月1日,安理会各成员国对此“造成至少十位平民死亡的行径”进行了一致谴责,并呼吁对此事进行“迅速、公正、诚信、透明的调查”。 土耳其和其它国家的措辞原本比现在更为强硬,在美国外交官的艰难斡旋下才有所缓和。但奥巴马政府未能将针对以色列的反对之声一概否决,以色列几乎将美国的这种行为视为背叛。以色列外交情报局摩萨德(Mossad)的老大警告以色列国会委员会:对美国而言,以色列正变得“连战略资产都算不上”(美方观点见文)

The disconnect between the way Israel sees itself and its actions and the way they are viewed by the world outside has never, it seems, been so wide. Nor has it ever been so starkly highlighted as by the bungled operation in the Mediterranean, some 80km (50 miles) off Israel’s (and Gaza’s) coast. A wave of anti-Israel demonstrations swept through cities around the world and Turkey recalled its ambassador.

以色列对自己和自身行径的认识与其它国家对它的认识似乎大相径庭。它在距以色列海岸(和加沙海岸)约80公里(50英里)的地中海上的愚蠢行径,使其成为人们空前关注的对象。反以浪潮示威活动席卷了全球各个城市,土耳其也召回了驻以大使。

Inside Israel, too, the gulf is palpably deepening between leftish liberals and the rightist-religious government coalition that represents majority opinion. Writers, such as Amos Oz and David Grossman, and left-wing politicians voiced their criticism this week of the entire policy of blockade and boycott against Hamas-ruled Gaza. But their opinions were widely excoriated as treachery and defeatism.

同样,在以色列内部,左翼自由党和代表着多数人观点的右翼宗教政府联盟之间的鸿沟也在明显加深。本周,左翼政客以及阿摩司•奥兹(Amos Oz)和大卫•格罗斯曼(David Grossman)等作家谴责了以色列封锁、抵制哈马斯统治下的加沙地带的行径。可他们的观点却遭到许多人的痛斥,被批评为“背信弃义”及“失败主义”。

Where cracks did appear in the broad front of righteous victimhood was over the actual execution of the naval operation. Even the politicians and generals who insisted that the activists were “al-Qaeda-linked mercenaries who laid an ambush for our soldiers” could not cogently explain why the naval commando unit had fallen straight into this ambush.

这一号称正义受害者的广泛战线就海军军事行动的实际执行也存有分歧。甚至是那些坚持认为“活动分子与基地组织有雇佣关系,他们对我们的士兵设下了埋伏”的政客和将领也无法令人信服地解释:为什么海军突击队会直接降落到活动分子的“埋伏”当中。

Within the army, there was finger-pointing at the intelligence branch, which had failed to predict the reception awaiting the troops. Within the cabinet, recriminations have begun. There were even brief mutterings among Binyamin Netanyahu’s aides about the impetuosity of Ehud Barak, the defence minister, who had decided on the operation. But these were quickly squelched. Plainly the prime minister is not prepared to target, and risk losing, the leader of the Labour Party who has become his close political ally.

军队内部,有人指责情报部门未能预先估计到部队可能遭此款待。政府内部,也已经展开了相互指责。甚至内塔尼亚胡的副官,也会彼此偶尔抱怨此次行动的决策人——性急的国防部长埃胡德·巴拉克。但这些很快被压制下来。显然,总理不打算针对、也不愿意冒险失去这位早已成为其亲密政治盟友的工党领袖。

The prime minister was on a visit to Canada when things went horribly wrong. He was due to see Barack Obama in the White House the next day for what the Americans were billing as a fence-mending meeting after months of public tension. He hesitated, but eventually cancelled the meeting and flew home. The White House apparently was not offering the beleaguered prime minister a shoulder-to-shoulder public appearance alongside Mr Obama to help fend off the criticism. A spokesman said Mr Netanyahu had an open invitation to return.

在一切开始错得离谱时,以色列总理正在访问加拿大。他原定次日于白宫与奥巴马会面,在历经数月的紧张局势后参加美国对外宣称的“修复友好关系会议”。他曾为此犹豫不决,但最终还是取消了此次会议,乘机返回以色列。显然,为了避开指责,白宫并没有让这位四面楚歌的总理与奥巴马先生在公众场合共同亮相。某位发言人称:内塔尼亚胡收到请他返回美国参加会议的公开邀请。

Meanwhile, Mr Obama will be meeting the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, in Washington on June 9th in an effort to salvage the recently started “proximity” peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Hamas, triumphant at the turn of events, has urged the authority to break off the talks.

同时,奥巴马先生将于6月9日在华盛顿召开的会议上与巴勒斯坦总统马哈茂德•阿巴斯会面,以尽力挽救刚开始“接近”和解的以巴谈判。哈马斯在事态转变中胜出,并敦促当局中止会谈。更多信息请访问:http://www.24en.com/

The immediate task for Israel is to enlist American help in order to preclude international demands for an external inquiry, which it fears would be weighted against it. According to Israeli sources, America is said to be urging Mr Netanyahu to appoint without delay an Israeli inquiry under a High Court judge. But, at the same time, Israeli officials fear that diplomatic help from Washington to ease the crisis will come with a “price tag” in the peace negotiations. In the Israeli peace camp, people positively hope that this will be the case.

以色列担心国际社会要求的对以质询将会对自己不利,它的当务之急是争取美国的帮助以避免外部质询。以色列消息称,美国正敦促内塔尼亚胡先生即刻任命一名以色列高等法院法官进行质询。但同时,以色列官员担心,华盛顿方面提供的缓解此次危机的外交援助将成为他们在和平谈判中的“筹码”。以色列和平阵营则无疑希望能确有其事。

Israeli diplomats and soldiers are working the phones to Istanbul to try to prevent a complete rupture of relations with Turkey. The two countries, and especially their military establishments, have developed over decades a strategic alliance that has been a discreet but important axis of power in the region. But relations have recently soured with Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, repeatedly and vehemently criticising Israel’s policies towards Gaza (see article). A further deterioration would quickly follow if Turkey sent its own navy to escort future blockade-busting ships; Israel has said that it would stop any such attempt.

以色列外交官和军人正电话联络伊斯坦布尔,试图避免与土耳其关系完全破裂。两国的战略联盟,尤其是军事机构间联盟,已经发展了数十年,成为了该地区谨慎但重要的轴心。但最近土耳其总理埃尔多安一再强烈批评以色列的加沙政策(见文章),两国关系恶化。如果将来土耳其派遣自己的海军为突破封锁的船只护航,两国关系将迅速进一步恶化;以色列已表示,它将制止任何此类企图。

The Gazan pressure-cooker

加沙施压者

Not only Israel but America and the other Western countries which helped to isolate Gaza as a means of combating Hamas are now under pressure to rethink the blockade's efficacy. Israel does not bear sole responsibility, the International Crisis Group, a think-tank, pointed out this week. "For years, many in the international community have been complicit in a policy that aimed at isolating Gaza in the hope of weakening Hamas. This policy is morally appalling and politically self-defeating. It has harmed the people of Gaza without loosening Hamas's control."

以色列、甚至美国和其他支持封锁加沙的西方国家将封锁视为打击哈马斯的一种手段,现在他们都迫于压力重新思考封锁效力。本周,智囊团国际危机小组指出以色列不应为此承担全部责任。“多年来,国际社会中许多国家都已就孤立加沙政策达成共谋,并期望以此削弱哈马斯的力量。这项政策在道义上有些骇人听闻,在政治上有些弄巧成拙。它并未使哈马斯放松对加沙的控制,反而损害了加沙人民。

The policy began within weeks of Israel’s pull-out from Gaza in 2005. At the start, America tried to keep the gates open, brokering an Agreement on Movement and Access with Israel to allow the export from Gaza of hundreds of trucks of produce a day, regular bus convoys to and from the West Bank and the opening of a Palestinian-controlled crossing at Rafah to Egypt. But the agreement was in ink only. After just one year Gaza’s exports stood at a mere 8% of the agreed amount, Rafah was closed and the buses never came. Once the strip was under Hamas’s total control, Israel declared it a hostile entity, and prevented movement to and from the territory.

封锁政策是在2005年以色列撤离加沙的几个星期里开始实施的。起初美,国曾尽力保持加沙门户开放,与以色列达成了一项通行进出协定,协定允许每天可有数百辆物资卡车从加沙输出物资,准许普通巴士车队进出约旦河西岸并开放一处由巴勒斯坦控制的位于拉法的口岸,该口岸可通往埃及。然而,该协定仅是纸面文章。一年后,加沙的输出物资仅占协定数量的8%,拉法被关闭,巴士不见踪影。哈马斯刚刚完全掌控了加沙地带,以色列立即将加沙宣布为敌对实体,并制止一切进出该领土的相关活动。

Initially Hamas and other militant groups, drunk on their self-claimed success in forcing Israel’s departure, sought to fight their way out with projectiles. The number of mostly home-made rockets hitting Israel rose from 281 in 2004 to 1,750 in 2008; and their range rose from a few kilometres to reach Tel Aviv’s outskirts. But stung by the ferocity of Israel’s reprisals, most lethally in the January 2009 war, Hamas reined in its fire and forced others to do likewise. So far this year 34 rockets have landed in Israel, none launched by Hamas. “Hamas is defending Israel,” chuckles an Israeli foreign ministry official.

最初,哈马斯和其他激进组织因为迫使以色列离开了该区域,沉浸于自我标榜的成功中,并企图以炮弹打出天下。他们用来袭击以色列的飞弹多为本土制造,数量从2004的281枚增加到2008年的1750枚;打击范围也从几公里扩展至特拉维夫郊外。但是以色列发起的凶残报复——最具威胁性的是2009年1月的战争——使哈马斯受到重创,哈马斯遏制了它的火力,其他武装力量也同样效仿。今年,迄今为止已有34枚飞弹落在以色列,却没有一枚出自哈马斯之手。一名以色列外交官笑称:“哈马斯是在保卫以色列”。

Instead Hamas has turned its energies inward. With Gazans locked inside the 40km by 10km (154 square-mile) strip, the siege has given Hamas a free hand to mould the place. Its leaders liken Gaza to a ribat, a warrior monastery, and its inmates to murabitoun, or militant monks, recalling the 11th-century revivalist movement which withdrew to the Moroccan highlands before sweeping onto the Moroccan plains and Andalusia. They regale the struggle to survive with the same terminology they once used for fighting Israel. To ensure supplies they created a “resistance” economy, supervising the digging of an elaborate web of tunnels snaking under Gaza’s border with Egypt.

哈马斯反而将精力转向内部。加沙人民被封锁在40乘以10公里的(154平方英里)区域内,这使哈马斯得以放手塑造该地区。其领导人将加沙比作“里巴特”(ribat)——一座武士修道院,将其居民比做穆瓦希德(murabitoun),或称好战的僧侣,它使人回想起11世纪的复兴运动,在还未席卷摩洛哥平原和安达卢西亚时,该复兴运动撤回到摩洛哥高地。正象当年与以色列做战时一样,他们为了生存饱经风霜。为了保证物资供给,他们开创了“抵制”经济,对挖掘蜿蜒于加沙与埃及交界处的复杂的隧道网络进行监管。

At first the resistance economy failed to meet people’s needs. But today, thanks to the tunnels, Gaza’s shop shelves are brimming with goods that often arrive cheaper and faster than when Israel opened the gates. Winches hoist in aggregates, allowing a spate of road repairs and housing construction. The authorities have filled in the craters in the football stadia left by Israel’s bombs and adorned the highways with cat’s eyes. Unlike post-war repairs elsewhere, the reconstruction is home-grown. Hamstrung by their own restrictions which prevent them buying smuggled goods, the UN and other international agencies have written themselves out of the repair effort. Unable to bring in cement to repair its schools, UNRWA, the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency which educates half of Gaza’s children, arranged to teach children in shipping containers, before Israel banned those too.

起初,抵制经济不能满足人们的需求。可现在多亏了这些隧道,输送到加沙的货品较以色列开放门户时更为便宜也更为快捷,这些货品塞满了加沙商店的货架。绞车吊起的物资总量足以进行大规模的道路维修和住房兴建。当局已填补了以色列的炸弹在足球场馆留下的弹坑,还以猫眼装饰公路。不同于别处的战后维修,这样的重建完全由他们自己完成。他们自己颁布了限令限制购买走私品,这令联合国及其它国际机构也无能为力,已将其划出战后维修的名单。加沙有一半的儿童在联合国巴勒斯坦难民机构——联合国难民救济及工程局——接受教育,因无法购进水泥修复校舍,在以色列还没取缔集装箱之前,工程局将教学点安排在了集装箱内。

Humanitarian agencies, with an eye on external financing, bewail the lack of development. But their indices miss the point. Gaza is redeveloping, and Hamas is making society in its own image. Huge amounts now pass through the tunnel shafts each year, creating a new economy from which Hamas creams a handsome share of the profits to finance its rule. “The siege is a gift,” says a Hamas minister.

期待外部资助的人道主义机构哀叹着发展落后。但他们在发展指数中漏了关键点。加沙正在重建,哈马斯正在按照自己的面貌来塑造社会。如今,每年有大量的物资穿过隧道竖井,开创着一个新的经济体,哈马斯从中提取了丰厚的利润份额用以为其统治提供资金支持。一位哈马斯部长如是说:“加沙之围是一份礼物”。

Co-ordinating the effort is a remarkably well-oiled bureaucracy. To finance its half-billion-dollar annual budget, the Hamas government has instituted an effective tax regime, raising duties on tunnel imports, including cigarettes, petrol, clothes and bread. Officials claim to have achieved self-sufficiency in melons (piled high on the roadsides) and onions; and the price of eggs has fallen to half what it is in the West Bank. With fishing in the seas restricted by Israel’s navy, Hamas is opening fish-farms in former Israeli settlements. Its institutions publish online compendia of the government’s directives, the results of civil service exams (based, they claim, on merit, not factional allegiance), and send text messages to the lucky few cleared for travel to Egypt to update them on bus and crossing times.

协调这项工作的是一个运作相当良好的官僚机构。哈马斯政府为了支付5亿美元的年度预算,已设立了有效的税收制度,提高了通过隧道进口的香烟,汽油,服装、面包等物资的税率。官方称西瓜(高高地堆放在路边)、洋葱已经达到自给自足的水平;鸡蛋的价格已经跌到约旦河西岸价格的一半。由于以色列海军禁止了该海域的捕鱼活动,哈马斯正开放前以色列人驻地的鱼场。哈马斯的机构在线公布政府方针、公务员考试结果(据他们称是基于任人唯贤而非任人为亲的原则),并向那些少数获准到埃及旅行的人发送短信,使他们可在巴士上或过境时收到最新消息。

More damagingly for Gaza’s people, the siege has also allowed for much greater control. Manned by militants from its Ezz al-Din al-Qassam brigades hitherto deployed against Israel, Hamas’s internal security applies the brigades’ blinkered codes to harness society. This has created stability but at the price of a reign of fear. When rival Islamists decried Hamas’s rule in Rafah, the militants stormed the mosque and killed its worshippers. When leftists protested that the tax rises hit a people already burdened by siege, they were hauled to jail. The death penalty has been reinstituted. And insensitive to comparisons with Israel, Hamas’s forces have bulldozed the homes of Gazans who had moved onto former settlement land without authorisation. A thriving political culture has been culled to a one-faction state.

加沙人遭遇的更为严重的危害是:加沙之围使得哈马斯有了更大的控制权。哈马斯的内部治安由迄今为止为抵抗以色列而布署的Ezz al-Din al-Qassam武装分子控制,他们使用闭目塞听的方式来控制社会。这在创造稳定的同时,却使这一时期充满畏惧。在敌对伊斯兰教徒谴责哈马斯在拉法的统治时,武装分子闯入清真寺并杀害寺内教徒。左翼分子认为增税是在四面楚歌的区域雪上加霜,并为此提出抗议,于是乎他们被送进监狱。死刑又重新设立。哈马斯势力并不在乎被拿来与以色列作比较,他们正在铲平之前那些未经授权擅自定居的加沙人的土地。蓬勃发展的政治文化已被扼杀至只余一个派系的状态。

Manning the institutions is a new generation of highly motivated Hamas cadres who unlike their seniors have not studied abroad and who, with their narrow horizons and siege-mentality, view outsiders, Palestinians and foreigners, with suspicion. Tensions have emerged with an older generation, including the prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh, who after an attack on UN summer camps pleaded for tolerance.

操纵着这些机构的是积极性颇高的哈马斯新一代骨干。不同于他们的前辈,这些人未曾留学海外,他们凭着狭隘的视野和四面楚歌的心态,以怀疑的眼光看待外界,包括巴勒斯坦人和外国人。包括总理哈尼亚在内的老一代骨干已显得有些惴惴不安,在哈马斯袭击了联合国夏令营后,哈尼亚出来恳求大家宽恕。

End of some activists' adventure某些活动分子冒险的下场

A few Hamas old-timers, educated in Moscow and Damascus, warned that in its hunger for power, the movement risks betraying its religious principles. Their pleas have fallen on deaf ears. Hamas's second generation—the 30-somethings who have lived their life under occupation—revel in the authority of office though lacking a clear vision of what they intend to do with their power.

一些曾于莫斯科和大马士革接受教育的哈马斯老前辈警告:哈马斯对权力的渴求会使这次运动经受背离宗教原则的风险。他们的呼求被置若罔闻。第二代哈马斯骨干——30岁左右的年轻人——一直生活在被占领的状态下,他们醉心于权力,可是对于该利用自己的权力去做些什么却没有明确的目标。

Opening borders to allow Gazans to travel again and let other influences in could eat into that unfettered absolutism. But few international policymakers appear to know what to do or how. For three years the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank backed by Western paymasters has waged a beauty contest with its Hamas rivals; many there remain loth to improve Gaza's odds. Egypt remains wary of another Islamist neighbour (Sudan is headache enough). For Israel, the siege might not have freed the kidnapped Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, or squeezed Gazans' bellies to the point where they rise up against Hamas (both official justifications for the siege), but it has won the more valuable prize of a divided Palestinian polity. Much as Israel planted settlers to impede a two-state settlement, so, argue some, it has now successfully planted Hamas.

开放边界,允许加沙人再次外出旅行,使其他势力有可能侵蚀进无所顾忌的专制主义。但似乎没什么国际决策者知道该做些什么或怎么去做。三年来,在西方财政机构支持下,位于约旦河西岸的巴勒斯坦权力机构与其哈马斯对手已举办了一次选美比赛;仍有许多人并不愿提高加沙的胜率。埃及继续警惕着他的另一个伊斯兰邻邦(苏丹已够令它头痛)。对以色列来说,围困加沙之举也许还没使被绑架的以色列士兵吉拉德•沙利特重获自由,也还没把加沙人饿到群起反抗哈马斯的地步(这两者都是以色列官方给出的围困加沙的理由),但它赢得的更有价值的奖品就是分裂的巴勒斯坦政体。为阻止两国共存,以色列造就了大量定居者,一些人认为:它因此成功造就了哈马斯。

In the wake of the international outcry, Israel and Egypt have both taken temporary remedial measures to ease their respective closures. But a more formal safety-valve is required. There are many ways to do this but each has its drawbacks. The airport has been put out of action by Israeli bombing. Constructing a sea port remains on hold because of lack of materials. Reopening the crossings with Israel would re-establish Gaza’s ties with the rest of Palestine. But Hamas—as happy to disengage from Israel as Israel is from it—prefers opening Rafah on the Egyptian border as a gate to the Islamic world.

遭遇国际社会强烈谴责后,以色列和埃及立即采取了临时补救措施以减轻各自的封闭状态。但必须要有一个更加正式的可对安全进行监管的“阀门”机构。要做到这一点,方法很多,但各有弊端。以色列的轰炸行动已使机场关闭。由于缺乏建材,港口的建设工作仍被搁置。与以色列重开口岸将重建加沙与巴勒斯坦其它区域的关系。可哈马斯与以色列一样为能摆脱对方而愉悦不已,它宁愿开放位于埃及边界上的拉法,将之作为通向伊斯兰世界的大门。

Regional and Western policymakers have tentatively hoped that intra-Palestinian reconciliation would end the siege. But advisers of President Abbas in Ramallah are suggesting something else. They are calling on him to head to Gaza immediately to emphasise his support for his besieged people and promote a federal arrangement under which the two governments might continue to rule under his baton. A vanguard was due in Gaza later this week despite Israeli and Hamas protests. If accompanied by the $4 billion odd that Arab and Western donors promised Gaza after the January 2009 war, such an arrangement might yet curry favour. But the prospects for a Palestinian rapprochement still look far more remote than the launch of another flotilla.

区域决策者及西方决策者暂时是希望加沙之围能以巴勒斯坦内部和解告终。但在拉马拉,巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯的参谋有不同意见。他们正呼吁总统立即前往加沙,突显他对被围人民的支持,并推动形成一个联邦政府,使两个执政政府继续在他的指挥棒下进行管辖。本周晚些时候,一支“先遣队”会到达加沙,虽然遭到以色列和哈马斯的抗议。如果这支“先遣队”还能带来阿拉伯世界和西方国家在2009年1月的战役后承诺向加沙捐助的40余亿美元,也许能为筹备联邦政府讨些好处。但让另一支小型船队启航似乎远比巴勒斯坦和解的前景更为现实。