TO IRAN'S irrepressible president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the deal was a triumph for the powers of the future over “the tyrant powers [who] belong to the past”. Others, tyrannically minded or not, have yet to see whether Brazil’s president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (flanking Mr Ahmadinejad above), really have succeeded in enticing Iran a step in from the cold in its row with the UN Security Council over its nuclear ambitions. Several years of on-off talks (mostly off, at Iran’s insistence) between Mr Ahmadinejad’s government and six other countries, America, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China, have failed to budge Iran from its insistence that its suspect nuclear work will continue, no matter what.更多信息请访问:http://www.24en.com/

对于难缠的伊朗总统Mahmoud Ahmadinejad来说,这份协议代表着未来的强权战胜了「属于过去的暴君强权」。无论本性凶残与否,旁观者必须看看巴西总统Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva和土耳其总理Recep Tayyip Erdogan(上图,站在Ahmadinejad两侧)是否真的成功诱使伊朗走下台阶,结束与联合国安理会关于核武野心争论的冰冷态度。Ahmadinejad政府与其它六国(美、英、法、德、俄和中国)之间几年来断断续续的谈判(大多因伊朗坚持己见而中断)无法逼使伊朗让步,伊朗坚持疑似核武计划无论如何都会继续下去。

Under the May 17th deal, Mr Ahmadinejad is to send abroad some of his low-enriched uranium stocks, in return for higher-enriched fuel rods Iran needs to replenish an ageing medical-research reactor. On the face of it, that resembles a bargain Iran had first struck last October with America, Russia, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear guardian, before it backed off. But the fear is that, well-meaning as the leaders of Turkey and Brazil may be, Iran is abusing their efforts to get out of a fix.

根据五月十七日的协议,Ahmadinejad将一些低浓缩铀的原料送往国外,以交换伊朗需要的高浓缩燃料棒,为一座年久失修的医学研究反应炉添加燃料。这件事情的外表上,类似去年十月伊朗与美国、俄罗斯、法国和国际原子能总署(IAEA)签订的第一份协议,伊朗后来背弃此一协议。但是,令人担忧的是土耳其和巴西领导人可能出自于一片善意,反而遭伊朗滥用他们的努力而脱离困境。

To those with past experience of Iran’s tactics, both timing and terms of the new deal look deeply suspect. Iran is facing a fourth set of UN sanctions. Two days after the Tehran “breakthrough”, a draft resolution agreed by the six countries Iran has been refusing to talk to, including previously reluctant Russia and China, was circulated to the rest of the Security Council. That was despite the claim by Turkey’s foreign minister that the Tehran deal meant further sanctions were now unwarranted.

过去与伊朗战术有交手经验的人士认为,这份新协议的时机和条件都令人深深怀疑。伊朗正面临联合国第四次制裁行动。在德黑兰「突破」之后的两天,伊朗一直拒绝谈判的六国(包括过去勉强的俄罗斯、中国)同意了一项草拟决议案,在安理会的其它成员国之间流传。尽管土耳其外交部长声称,这份德黑兰协议意指更进一步的制裁现在无法保证。

If voted through, the new resolution would add more names to a list of individuals, firms and banks sanctioned for their links to Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes and slap an arms embargo on heavy weapons. Suspect shipments to and from Iran could be searched. Iran would find it much harder to get foreign uranium for its enrichment machines, which Mr Ahmadinejad claims he set spinning merely to produce under 5% low-enriched uranium for nuclear-power reactors (though Iran has none that can use it), while others suspect it may eventually be used to make the 90%-enriched stuff needed for a bomb.

如果表决通过,新决议案将增列更多名字纳入个人、公司和银行的制裁名单,因为他们与伊朗核武和飞弹计划有关连,并且无视于重型武器的武器禁运。进出伊朗的疑似船运可能遭搜查,伊朗将发现更难为自己的浓缩机器取得外国铀,Ahmadinejad声称伊朗仅生产低于百分之五的低浓缩铀供应核电厂反应炉(虽然伊朗没有一个核电厂可以使用低浓缩铀),但其它国家都怀疑,伊朗可能最终用来制造核弹所需要的百分之九十浓缩铀。

Iran pooh-poohs sanctions, claiming even new ones won’t make it give up its “right” to enrich uranium. But its leaders have been courting other Security Council members, especially Brazil and Turkey. For, whatever their economic impact, widely supported UN sanctions do give the lie to Iran’s claims that it is the victim of a Western-inspired plot to deprive it of its right to nuclear energy, rather than being in the dock for what IAEA inspectors report have been serious violations of its nuclear safeguards. Iran also refuses point blank to answer more questions about activities that have little rational explanation except as part of a weapons effort.

伊朗不在乎制裁,声称甚至不会因为新制裁而放弃生产浓缩铀的「权利」。但是,伊朗领导人一直向安理会其它成员示好,特别是巴西和土耳其。无论带来多大的经济冲击,因为普遍支持联合国制裁案,揭穿了伊朗声称自己是西方密谋剥夺其拥有核能权利之受害者的谎言,而不是因IAEA观察团报告指其严重违反核子防护而列为被告。伊朗也坦率拒绝回答关于若干活动的更多质疑,这些活动除了与生产武器相关之外提不出其它合理解释。

Iran thus wants to block or delay a sanctions vote. But even if the October deal had gone through, harsher moves would have remained in play, both because their aim is to get Iran into wider talks than just those over fuel for its research reactor; and because, without pressure, Iran would be free to drag out talks uselessly. The October fuel deal was a gamble: Iran called it an acceptance of its “right” to uranium enrichment. But the rewards, had it chosen to negotiate seriously, were deemed worth the risk.

因此,伊朗想要防堵或拖延安理会的制裁表决。但是,即使去年十月协议已经通过,但更变本加厉的行动仍不断上演,皆因为伊朗拥有核武而让自己获得较之于研究反应炉燃料更多样的谈判;以及伊朗毫无压力地任意拖延无用的谈判。去年十月燃料协议是一场赌局︰伊朗称该协议接受该国拥有浓缩铀的「权利」。但是,报酬内容被认为值得冒险,伊朗选择认真磋商。

By shipping two-thirds of its then low-enriched uranium abroad, Iran would have been left, for perhaps six months while it rebuilt stocks, with less uranium in the country than would be needed, with further enrichment, for a breakout to a nuclear bomb. This, it was hoped, might create time for wider talks. More to the point, Russia’s offer to enrich the uranium from under 5% to the almost 20% needed for the medical reactor, along with France’s readiness to turn it into the needed fuel rods, mean Iran had no excuse to do the higher enrichment work itself. For it is a quirk of uranium enrichment that to get from 20% to 90% takes less effort than making the lesser-enriched stuff in the first place.

由于伊朗将三分之二的低浓缩铀运往海外,留在自己国内的铀藏量可能比进一步浓缩后用来生产核弹的需求量还少,或许六个月后才能恢复库存。因此,伊朗希望尽可能拖延进行更多样谈判的时间。此外,俄罗斯提供医学反应炉需要的纯度百分之五至几乎百分之二十的浓缩铀,配合法国愿意提供伊朗需要的燃料棒,让伊朗没有借口要去生产纯度更高的浓缩铀。因为这是铀浓缩的怪癖,将纯度由百分之二十提升至百分之九十的过程,较之于刚开始生产低纯度浓缩铀更不费功夫。

If a deal was worth trying then, surely it is worth trying now? But much has changed. Iran’s stock of low-enriched uranium is bigger: only about half of it would be needed to produce the equivalent fuel load for the medical reactor. Iran could have a full bomb’s-worth on hand again in no time. Earlier this year, Iran started its own 20% enrichment and insists that this will continue. That wipes out the hoped for non-proliferation gain, and may be a deal-breaker.

假若当时协议值得一试,确定值得现在尝试吗?但很多条件已经改变。伊朗的低浓缩铀藏量已经增加︰仅约一半被拿来生产用于医学反应炉的等量燃料,伊朗可以运用现有铀藏量立即制造一枚核弹。今年初,伊朗开始生产百分之二十的浓缩铀,并坚称会继续生产。伊朗彻底破灭了禁止核子扩散的希望,并且可能成为协议的破坏者。

Meanwhile the terms of the new accord are vague. Mr Ahmadinejad is to set out his ideas to the IAEA within days. But then he can take all the time he likes to haggle over details with America, France, Russia and the IAEA. Under the old deal, the uranium would have gone directly to Russia, then France for reworking. Under the new one, Turkey will take custody of it. But Turkey has no way to enrich it or make it into fuel. Does Iran expect to get the 20% enriched fuel rods from another source, while its own uranium is under Turkish guard? Also, under the deal with Turkey and Brazil, Mr Ahmadinejad can decide whether the deal is going as he likes. If it isn’t, Turkey must hand back his uranium forthwith.

同时,新协议的附带条件模糊不清。Ahmadinejad会在未来几天内向IAEA提出他的想法。但是,他可以尽可能拖延时间与美国、法国、俄罗斯和IAEA争论细节。根据原有协议,铀可以直接运往俄罗斯,然后送往法国加工。根据新协议,土耳其将负责保管铀。但是,土耳其无法加以浓缩或将铀转化成为燃料。伊朗期望从另一来源取得百分之二十的浓缩铀燃料棒,但伊朗愿意将自己的铀交由土耳其看管吗?此外,根据与土耳其和巴西的协议,Ahmadinejad可以决定这项协议是否如其所愿。如果不如所愿,土耳其必须即刻将铀归还伊朗。

For those trying to talk Iran out of potentially weapons-usable work, this seems to get them nowhere. But it could leave the Security Council split and make an end to the stand-off with Iran harder. Mr Ahmadinejad would be the winner.

对于那些试图阻止伊朗拥有核武的人士来说,这份协议似乎让他们一无是处。但是,这份协议已经使安理会意见分歧,而且要与伊朗结束僵局更加困难。Ahmadinejad将是最大赢家。