WHEN news emerged of the life-story of the Nigerian who tried to blow up a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day, there were cries of bewilderment in some quarters, groans of dismay in others, and shouts of “I told you so” from a small army of Cassandras①.
当圣诞节那天传出尼日利亚人试图炸毁从阿姆斯特丹飞往底特律的航班的消息后,某些团体发出杂乱的声音,有些因惊恐而抱怨不已,而有些卡桑德拉斯的信徒则叫嚣:“我早就告诉你会是这样”。
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Whatever motivated Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to become a terrorist, it was not material deprivation; he came from a rich family. The biographical detail that fascinated many terrorism-watchers was his record as president of the Islamic Society at University College London, where he had studied engineering.

是什么让穆塔拉布成为一个恐怖分子?他出身富裕,并非一无所有。其生平有一段细节吸引了恐怖主义监察员的兴趣,他在伦敦大学学院学习工程学期间出任该校伊斯兰社团的社长.

Some found his choice of subject significant. A forthcoming book by Steffen Hertog, a sociologist, will argue that terrorists include a high number of engineers—not because of their need for bomb-making skills, but perhaps because of a mindset that likes rigidity and binary choices.

一些人认为他的专业选择意味深长。社会学家Hertog在其即将出版的一本书中指出恐怖分子中包含一部分工程师——不仅因为需要制造炸弹的技能,也许还因为其偏爱顽固和两元性选择的心态。

In the young man’s homeland, meanwhile, people noted that for all their problems—including the existence of rival, armed fraternities known as “cults” but unconnected to faith—Nigerian universities are not known as hotbeds of Islamic extremism. It was apparently the loneliness and confusion of life in Britain that set this student on a path that led to terror.

然而在这个年轻人的故乡,人们注意到尽管有各种各样的问题——包括被称为“异教”、却与宗教无关的敌对的武装团体的存在——尼日利亚的大学并不是伊斯兰极端主义的温床。很明显是伦敦生活的孤独和困惑让这个学生走上了恐怖主义之路

Long before his bungled effort hit the headlines, the role of Islamic Societies (ISOCs in student jargon) in British colleges—and of similar associations on other Western campuses—was sparking arguments. In 2008 a report and opinion poll from the Centre for Social Cohesion, a right-of-centre think-tank, had argued that these Muslim student associations in Britain needed much more careful watching. They seemed to be acting as incubators for fundamentalist ideas that favoured self-segregation by Muslims, and dreamt of Islamic governance and law. And as the report noted, several young Britons involved in terrorism had a record of ISOC activism; for example, Yassin Nassari, convicted in 2007 of bringing missile plans into Britain, had led one branch of the ISOC at the University of Westminster.

在他拙劣的行为成为头条之前很长时间,伊斯兰社团在英国大学(学生一般称为ISOCs)——以及相似的团体在西方大学的作用就是一个激辩的论题。2008年一个中右性质的智囊,社会凝聚力中心(CSC)的一份报告和调研提出需要格外留心英国的穆斯林学生团体。它们似乎在充当符合自我隔离的穆斯林口味的原教旨主义,以及对伊斯兰统治与法律的幻想的孵化器。该报告指出一些与恐怖主义有关的英国年轻人都曾参与ISOC活动。举例而言,2007年时因携带导弹计划到英国而被判刑的Nassari,就曾是威斯敏斯特大学某ISOC组织的领导人。

The CSC report triggered an angry response from Britain’s Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) and 52 of its member bodies, calling the study “ideologically biased” and “motivated by…malice”. The current FOSIS president, Faisal Hanjra, responded to the news of Mr Abdulmutallab’s failed attack by insisting that there was “no credible evidence” to suggest that British universities were “arenas of radicalism”.

CSC的报告遭到了英国穆斯林学生社团联合会(FOSIS)的愤怒回应,称其是“意识形态上的偏见”和“出于怨恨”。现任FOSIS主席,Faisal Hanjra对穆塔拉布炸机未遂发表评论时坚称“没有明显证据”表明英国的大学是“极端主义的乐园”

But much of the information cited in the CSC report is uncontentious. At almost every British university, there is an ISOC to which practising Muslim students, seeking soulmates, soon gravitate. The societies’ roles include organising prayer rooms and Friday sermons, and securing halal food. Since it was created in 1962, the leadership of FOSIS has often had some ideological overlap with the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat e-Islami, the Pakistani Islamist party. That does not imply sympathy for al-Qaeda’s campaign of global terror, but it does imply adherence to a version of political Islam.

但CSC报告中列出的许多信息是毋庸置疑的。在几乎每座英国的大学都有ISOC,穆斯林学生在其中寻求精神伴侣,并很快为其吸引。社团的功能包括组织祈祷室和礼拜五的布道,以及提供伊斯兰食物。自1962年创建以来,FOSIS的领导者经常与(根据地在埃及的)穆斯林兄弟会Muslim Brotherhood和(巴基斯坦的伊斯兰党派)Jamaat e-Islami有理念的重叠。这并不表示其支持基地组织的全球恐怖主义战略,却意味着对某种伊斯兰政治形态的皈依。

In their countries of origin, Islamist political movements have long experience of recruiting on campus and of forming small groups which owe something to far-leftist prototypes. In Sudan, for example, veterans of the Brotherhood, which took power in the 1989, retain vivid memories of student activism, with a cell structure that Leon Trotsky would have recognised. Such secrecy is not usually necessary in Western countries, but the memory of working in semi-covert conditions must have an effect on the culture of Islamist movements wherever they function.

在其发源地,伊斯兰政治运动在吸收大学生和极左翼小团体成员方面经验丰富。例如在苏丹,兄弟会1989年开始掌权,其老兵Leon Trotsky凭借一个细胞结构物就能生动回忆起学生运动的场景。在西方国家一般不需如此保密,但这种半地下状态工作的记忆无论在何处对伊斯兰运动文化肯定有效。

In the 1990s another global Islamist movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir②—which aspires to a caliphate and eschews electoral democracy—was very active on British campuses. It has since lowered its profile.

1990年代另一场全球范围的伊斯兰运动,伊扎布特——旨在建立一个哈里发国家摒弃选举民主——就曾在英国大学里异常活跃。此后规模有所缩减。

At the other end of the Islamic spectrum, Turkish students who find themselves far from home (either in their homeland or in a foreign country, such as Britain) often fall under the influence of the Fethullah Gulen③ movement, which is impeccably moderate in its political views but encourages Muslims to practise their faith rigorously. With its deep pockets, the movement helps many students with practical problems like accommodation; they are then urged to pray more often.

伊斯兰世界的另一端,土耳其学生发现不论是在国内还是国外,如英国,都经常受到葛士兰运动的影响。虽然其政治主张毋庸疑问是温和的,但却提倡穆斯林严格遵循他们的信仰。借助其巨大的财力,葛士兰运动为许多学生解决了向住房这样的实际问题,这些学生因此被要求更频繁的做祈祷。

Among Western countries, Britain stands out as a place where Muslim students (who number about 100,000 or around 5% of the total student population) are visible and self-confident. But all over the world, the increased profile of Islam on campus has created tension, curiosity and unlikely partnerships.

英国的穆斯林学生(大约10万名,约占学生总数5%)可以抛头露面并且充满自信,这在西方国家里比较杰出。但在全球范围内,大学里不断增加的伊斯兰学生规模已经引起了紧张状态、好奇而且不大可能有伙伴。

Sohaib Nazeer Sultan, the newly appointed Muslim chaplain at Princeton University, says that neither there, nor at the two other American campuses where he has worked, did any student under his care show signs of real extremism. But theological differences certainly exist, and have to be managed. Some students hew to the mystical, Sufi③ reading of Islam whereas others prefer the one-size-fits-all version of the faith that emphasises the unity of all Muslims and is highly suspicious of cultural difference between say, South Asians and Egyptians.

新当选的普林斯顿大学穆斯林牧师Sultan说不论是普林斯顿还是他工作过的其他两家美国大学,他辅导的学生中并没人显示出极端主义的迹象。但理念上的差异的确存在,并需要得到管控。一些学生固守神秘主义、苏菲派的伊斯兰读物,而其他一些则偏好一种普世的信仰,强调穆斯林的统一,并对与其他的文化(如南亚和埃及)之间的差异高度怀疑。

If Muslims on campus hang out together, Mr Sultan notes, it is not merely to pray or burnish each other’s faith; they are also looking for a modest social life that does not involve intoxicants. In that quest they often find allies, like Orthodox Jews.

Sultan指出如果穆斯林住在一起,不仅仅是祈祷或擦亮每个人的信仰;他们还在寻找一种平和的没有诱惑力的社会生活。在这种追求中他们经常找到志同道合之人,如传统的犹太人

At Canada’s McGill University, controversy has been raging since 2005 when the authorities deprived Muslim students (who now number about 2,000) of a prayer room, on the ground that this was inappropriate for a secular institution. The 600 or so who turn up for Friday prayers made their supplications outdoors for a while, until cold weather forced them from one temporary room to another. Nafay Choudhury, a leader of the Muslim Students Association, says things are much better for his co-religionists at most other Canadian colleges; the McGill Muslims are placing their hopes in an appeal to Quebec’s Human Rights Commission.

在加拿大的麦基尔大学,自从2005年管理者剥夺了穆斯林学生(约2000人)的一间祈祷间之后,有关这样做对一个世俗学校而言是否合适的争论就未曾平息。大约600人转而采取参加周五礼拜,在户外祈祷片刻,然而寒冷的天气迫使他们不得不一直寻找一间临时房间。穆斯林学生协会的一位负责人Nafay Choudhury说在加拿大其他大学,与他有共同信仰的人境遇要好得多。麦基尔的穆斯林正把他们的希望寄托在向魁北克人权委员会的一项仲裁上。更多信息请访问:http://www.24en.com/

Across the Western world, many Muslim students feel defensive. A request for information from Al-Furqan, an association of Muslim students at the University of Amsterdam, whose aims include the improvement of Islam’s image, elicited the following reply: “Thank you for your interest in our student association. However we would like to inform you that we have no interest in answering your inquiry.”

在整个西方世界,许多穆斯林学生都心怀戒备。阿姆斯特丹大学的一个穆斯林协会Al-Furqan进行了一项包括旨在概括伊斯兰形象提升在内的调查,得出如下答复:“感谢您对本学生团体的关注,但我们却要告诉您我们对回答您的调查没有兴趣”

注①Cassandras:是希腊神话中拥有预言能力的女子,特洛伊国王普里阿摩斯(King Priam)之女。她拥有预知能力,曾遇见了特洛伊木马计和阿伽门农之死,却没有人相信她。现在一般指不断预感到不幸的人或不幸与灾祸的预言者。
②HIZB-UT-TAHRIR:伊扎布特意为“伊斯兰解放党”或“伊斯兰拯救党”,前苏联解体后中亚出现的三大伊斯兰运动派别(另两个分别是伊斯兰复兴党(The Islamic Renaissance Party,IRP)和乌兹别克斯坦伊斯兰运动(The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,IMU)之一,前身为“穆斯林兄弟会”巴勒斯坦分支机构。由耶路撒冷伊斯兰教教法官塔吉纳巴尼法拉斯蒂于1952 年创建。主张以非暴力方式夺取政权,以费尔甘纳为中心,建立一个包括乌兹别克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、俄罗斯车臣地区和部分哈萨克斯坦、中国新疆等广大领域的“伊斯兰哈里发帝国”,即“通过发动非暴力的和平‘圣战’,建立单一的伊斯兰教法统治的‘哈里发’国家”。该组织的中央机构是“伊扎布特委员会”,其下层组织逐级为“伊扎布特”君主、“伊扎布特”君主部、玛扎里木宫廷、木依塔买德、乃克甫、加哈孜等。基层一般分为若干小组,每个小组由五至七人组成,并有一个小组长。由于该组织紧紧抓住了中亚社会面临的各种困境和难题,因此它的出现吸引了一批具有强烈反抗意识和宗教想法的年轻人参与,在中亚各国发展很快。由于具有一定的隐蔽性和斗争的策略性,该组织对中亚安全造成了很大的危害。从它的发展趋势上来看,暴力色彩也越来越浓厚。“9.11”事件后,该组织在中亚的影响逐步扩大,在乌、吉、塔三国有很多成员和支持者,其中乌有1.5万名成员,吉南部有两千多名成员,在吉的奥什州每五、六个人中就有一个是其支持者。1999年,新疆首次发现中亚“伊扎布特”组织在新疆建立的分部,其重点是在青年、知识分子中发展成员。有消息表明该组织与“基地组织”和“乌兹别克斯坦伊斯兰运动”保持着密切关系。③Sufi:苏非派,主张通过虔修默祷,生活简朴禁欲达到人主合一