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Chapter 5

ON the eastern side of Huesca, until late March, nothing happened--almost literally nothing. We were twelve hundred metres from the enemy. When the Fascists were driven back into Huesca the Republican Army troops who held this part of the line had not been over-zealous in their advance, so that the line formed a kind of pocket. Later it would have to be advanced--a ticklish job under fire--but for the present the enemy might as well have been nonexistent; our sole preoccupation was keeping warm and getting enough to eat. As a matter of fact there were things in this period that interested me greatly, and I will describe some of them later. But I shall be keeping nearer to the order of events if I try here to give some account of the internal political situation on the Government side.

At the beginning I had ignored the political side of the war, and it was only about this time that it began to force itself upon my attention. If you are not interested in the horrors of party politics, please skip; I am trying to keep the political parts of this narrative in separate chapters for precisely that purpose. But at the same time it would be quite impossible to write about the Spanish war from a purely military angle. It was above all things a political war. No event in it, at any rate during the first year, is intelligible unless one has some grasp of the inter-party struggle that was going on behind the Government lines.

When I came to Spain, and for some time afterwards, I was not only uninterested in the political situation but unaware of it. I knew there was a war on, but I had no notion what kind of a war. If you had asked me why I had joined the militia I should have answered: 'To fight against Fascism,' and if you had asked me what I was fighting for, I should have answered: 'Common decency.' I had accepted the News Chronicle-New Statesman version of the war as the defence of civilization against a maniacal outbreak by an army of Colonel Blimps in the pay of Hitler. The revolutionary atmosphere of Barcelona had attracted me deeply, but I had made no attempt to understand it. As for the kaleidoscope of political parties and trade unions, with their tiresome names-- P.S.U.C., P.O.U.M., F.A.I., C.N.T., U.G.T., J.C.I., J.S.U., A.I.T.--they merely exasperated me. It looked at first sight as though Spain were suffering from a plague of initials. I knew that I was serving in something called the P.O.U.M. (I had only joined the P.O.U.M. militia rather than any other because I happened to arrive in Barcelona with I.L.P. papers), but I did not realize that there were serious differences between the political parties. At Monte Pocero, when they pointed to the position on our left and said:

'Those are the Socialists' (meaning the P.S.U.C.), I was puzzled and said: 'Aren't we all Socialists?' I thought it idiotic that people fighting for their lives should have separate parties; my attitude always was, 'Why can't we drop all this political nonsense and get on with the war?' This of course was the correct' anti-Fascist' attitude which had been carefully disseminated by the English newspapers, largely in order to prevent people from grasping the real nature of the struggle. But in Spain, especially in Catalonia, it was an attitude that no one could or did keep up indefinitely. Everyone, however unwillingly, took sides sooner or later. For even if one cared nothing for the political parties and their conflicting 'lines', it was too obvious that one's own destiny was involved. As a militiaman one was a soldier against Franco, but one was also a pawn in an enormous struggle that was being fought out between two political theories. When I scrounged for firewood on the mountainside and wondered whether this was really a war or whether the News Chronicle had made it up, when I dodged the Communist machine-guns in the Barcelona riots, when I finally fled from Spain with the police one jump behind me--all these things happened to me in that particular way because I was serving in the P.O.U.M. militia and not in the P.S.U.C. So great is the difference between two sets of initials!

To understand the alignment on the Government side one has got to remember how the war started. When the fighting broke out on 18 July it is probable that every anti-Fascist in Europe felt a thrill of hope. For here at last, apparently, was democracy standing up to Fascism. For years past the so-called democratic countries had been surrendering to Fascism at every step. The Japanese had been allowed to do as they liked in Manchuria. Hitler had walked into power and proceeded to massacre political opponents of all shades. Mussolini had bombed the Abyssinians while fifty-three nations (I think it was fifty-three) made pious noises 'off'. But when Franco tried to overthrow a mildly Left-wing Government the Spanish people, against all expectation, had risen against him. It seemed--possibly it was--the turning of the tide.

But there were several points that escaped general notice. To begin with, Franco was not strictly comparable with Hitler or Mussolini. His rising was a military mutiny backed up by the aristocracy and the Church, and in the main, especially at the beginning, it was an attempt not so much to impose Fascism as to restore feudalism. This meant that Franco had against him not only the working class but also various sections of the liberal bourgeoisie--the very people who are the supporters of Fascism when it appears in a more modern form. More important than this was the fact that the Spanish working class did not, as we might conceivably do in England, resist Franco in the name of 'democracy' and the status quo', their resistance was accompanied by--one might almost say it consisted of--a definite revolutionary outbreak. Land was seized by the peasants; many factories and most of the transport were seized by the trade unions; churches were wrecked and the priests driven out or killed. The Daily Mail, amid the cheers of the Catholic clergy, was able to represent Franco as a patriot delivering his country from hordes of fiendish 'Reds'.

For the first few months of the war Franco's real opponent was not so much the Government as the trade unions. As soon as the rising broke out the organized town workers replied by calling a general strike and then by demanding --and, after a struggle, getting--arms from the public arsenals. If they had not acted spontaneously and more or less independently it is quite conceivable that Franco would never have been resisted. There can, of course, be no certainty about this, but there is at least reason for thinking it. The Government had made little or no attempt to forestall the rising, which had been foreseen for a long time past, and when the trouble started its attitude was weak and hesitant, so much so, indeed, that Spain had three premiers in a single day. [Note 1, below] Moreover, the one step that could save the immediate situation, the arming of the workers, was only taken unwillingly and in response to violent popular clamour. However, the arms were distributed, and in the big towns of eastern Spain the Fascists were defeated by a huge effort, mainly of the working class, aided by some of the armed forces (Assault Guards, etc.) who had remained loyal. It was the kind of effort that could probably only be made by people who were fighting with a revolutionary intention--i.e. believed that they were fighting for something better than the status quo. In the various centres of revolt it is thought that three thousand people died in the streets in a single day. Men and women armed only with sticks of dynamite rushed across the open squares and stormed stone buildings held by trained soldiers with machine-guns. Machine-gun nests that the Fascists had placed at strategic spots were smashed by rushing taxis at them at sixty miles an hour. Even if one had heard nothing of the seizure of the land by the peasants, the setting up of local Soviets, etc., it would be hard to believe that the Anarchists and Socialists who were the backbone of the resistance were doing this kind of thing for the preservation of capitalist democracy, which especially in the Anarchist view was no more than a centralized swindling machine.

[Note 1. Quiroga, Barrios, and Giral. The first two refused to distribute arms to the trade unions.]

Meanwhile the workers had weapons in their hands, and at this stage they refrained from giving them up. (Even a year later it was computed that the Anarcho-Syndicalists in Catalonia possessed 30,000 rifles.) The estates of the big pro-Fascist landlords were in many places seized by the peasants. Along with the collectivization of industry and transport there was an attempt to set up the rough beginnings of a workers' government by means of local committees, workers' patrols to replace the old pro-capitalist police forces, workers' militias based on the trade unions, and so forth. Of course the process was not uniform, and it went further in Catalonia than elsewhere. There were areas where the institutions of local government remained almost untouched, and others where they existed side by side with revolutionary committees. In a few places independent Anarchist communes were set up, and some of them remained in being till about a year later, when they were forcibly suppressed by the Government. In Catalonia, for the first few months, most of the actual power was in the hands of the Anarcho-syndicalists, who controlled most of the key industries. The thing that had happened in Spain was, in fact, not merely a civil war, but the beginning of a revolution. It is this fact that the anti-Fascist press outside Spain has made it its special business to obscure. The issue has been narrowed down to 'Fascism versus democracy' and the revolutionary aspect concealed as much as possible. In England, where the Press is more centralized and the public more easily deceived than elsewhere, only two versions of the Spanish war have had any publicity to speak of: the Right-wing version of Christian patriots versus Bolsheviks dripping with blood, and the Left-wing version of gentlemanly republicans quelling a military revolt. The central issue has been successfully covered up.

There were several reasons for this. To begin with, appalling lies about atrocities were being circulated by the pro-Fascist press, and well-meaning propagandists undoubtedly thought that they were aiding the Spanish Government by denying that Spain had 'gone Red'. But the main reason was this: that, except for the small revolutionary groups which exist in all countries, the whole world was determined, upon preventing revolution in Spain. In particular the Communist Party, with Soviet Russia behind it, had thrown its whole weight against the revolution. It was the Communist thesis that revolution at this stage would be fatal and that what was to be aimed at in Spain was not workers' control, but bourgeois democracy. It hardly needs pointing out why 'liberal' capitalist opinion took the same line. Foreign capital was heavily invested in Spain. The Barcelona Traction Company, for instance, represented ten millions of British capital; and meanwhile the trade unions had seized all the transport in Catalonia. If the revolution went forward there would be no compensation, or very little; if the capitalist republic prevailed, foreign investments would be safe. And since the revolution had got to be crushed, it greatly simplified things to pretend that no revolution had happened. In this way the real significance of every event could be covered up; every shift of power from the trade unions to the central Government could be represented as a necessary step in military reorganization. The situation produced was curious in the extreme. Outside Spain few people grasped that there was a revolution; inside Spain nobody doubted it. Even the P.S.U.C. newspapers. Communist-controlled and more or less committed to an anti-revolutionary policy, talked about 'our glorious revolution'. And meanwhile the Communist press in foreign countries was shouting that there was no sign of revolution anywhere; the seizure of factories, setting up of workers' committees, etc., had not happened--or, alternatively, had happened, but 'had no political significance'. According to the Daily Worker (6 August 1936) those who said that the Spanish people were fighting for social revolution, or for anything other than bourgeois democracy, were' downright lying scoundrels'. On the other hand, Juan Lopez, a member of the Valencia Government, declared in February 1937 that 'the Spanish people are shedding their blood, not for the democratic Republic and its paper Constitution, but for . . . a revolution'. So it would appear that the downright lying scoundrels included members of the Government for which we were bidden to fight. Some of the foreign anti-Fascist papers even descended to the pitiful lie of pretending that churches were only attacked when they were used as Fascist fortresses. Actually churches were pillaged everywhere and as a matter of course, because it was perfectly well understood that the Spanish Church was part of the capitalist racket. In six months in Spain I only saw two undamaged churches, and until about July 1937 no churches were allowed to reopen and hold services, except for one or two Protestant churches in Madrid.

But, after all, it was only the beginning of a revolution, not the complete thing. Even when the workers, certainly in Catalonia and possibly elsewhere, had the power to do so, they did not overthrow or completely replace the Government. Obviously they could not do so when Franco was hammering at the gate and sections of the middle class were on their side. The country was in a transitional state that was capable either of developing in the direction of Socialism or of reverting to an ordinary capitalist republic. The peasants had most of the land, and they were likely to keep it, unless Franco won; all large industries had been collectivized, but whether they remained collectivized, or whether capitalism was reintroduced, would depend finally upon which group gained control. At the beginning both the Central Government and the Generalite de Cataluna (the semi-autonomous Catalan Government) could definitely be said to represent the working class. The Government was headed by Caballero, a Left-wing Socialist, and contained ministers representing the U.G.T. (Socialist trade unions) and the C.N.T. (Syndicalist unions controlled by the Anarchists). The Catalan Generalite was for a while virtually superseded by an anti-Fascist Defence Committee [Note 2, below] consisting mainly of delegates from the trade unions. Later the Defence Committee was dissolved and the Generalite was reconstituted so as to represent the unions and the various Left-wing parties. But every subsequent reshuffling of the Government was a move towards the Right. First the P.O.U.M. was expelled from the Generalite; six months later Caballero was replaced by the Right-wing Socialist Negrin; shortly afterwards the C.N.T. was eliminated from the Government; then the U.G.T.; then the C.N.T. was turned out of the Generalite; finally, a year after the outbreak of war and revolution, there remained a Government composed entirely of Right-wing Socialists, Liberals, and Communists.

[Note 2. Comite Central de Milicias Antifascistas. Delegates were chosen in proportion to the membership of their organizations. Nine delegates represented the trade unions, three the Catalan Liberal parties, and two the various Marxist parties (P.O.U.M., Communists, and others).]

The general swing to the Right dates from about October-November 1936, when the U.S.S.R. began to supply arms to the Government and power began to pass from the Anarchists to the Communists. Except Russia and Mexico no country had had the decency to come to the rescue of the Government, and Mexico, for obvious reasons, could not supply arms in large quantities. Consequently the Russians were in a position to dictate terms. There is very little doubt that these terms were, in substance, 'Prevent revolution or you get no weapons', and that the first move against the revolutionary elements, the expulsion of the P.O.U.M. from the Catalan Generalite, was done under orders from the U.S.S.R. It has been denied that any direct pressure was exerted by the Russian Government, but the point is not of great importance, for the Communist parties of all countries can be taken as carrying out Russian policy, and it is not denied that the Communist Party was the chief mover first against the P.O.U.M., later against the Anarchists and against Caballero's section of the Socialists, and, in general, against a revolutionary policy. Once the U.S.S.R. had intervened the triumph of the Communist Party was assured. To begin with, gratitude to Russia for the arms and the fact that the Communist Party, especially since the arrival of the International Brigades, looked capable of winning the war, immensely raised the Communist prestige. Secondly, the Russian arms were supplied via the Communist Party and the parties allied to them, who saw to it that as few as possible got to their political opponents. [Note 3, below] Thirdly, by proclaiming a non-revolutionary policy the Communists were able to gather in all those whom the extremists had scared. It was easy, for instance, to rally the wealthier peasants against the collectivization policy of the Anarchists. There was an enormous growth in the membership of the party, and the influx was largely from the middle class--shopkeepers, officials, army officers, well-to-do peasants, etc., etc. The war was essentially a triangular struggle. The fight against Franco had to continue, but the simultaneous aim of the Government was to recover such power as remained in the hands of the trade unions. It was done by a series of small moves--a policy of pin-pricks, as somebody called it--and on the whole very cleverly. There was no general and obvious counter-revolutionary move, and until May 1937 it was scarcely necessary to use force. The workers could always be brought to heel by an argument that is almost too obvious to need stating: 'Unless you do this, that, and the other we shall lose the war.' In every case, needless to say, it appeared that the thing demanded by military necessity was the surrender of something that the workers had won for themselves in 1936. But the argument could hardly fail, because to lose the war was the last thing that the revolutionary parties wanted; if the war was lost democracy and revolution. Socialism and Anarchism, became meaningless words. The Anarchists, the only revolutionary party that was big enough to matter, were obliged to give way on point after point. The process of collectivization was checked, the local committees were got rid of, the workers patrols were abolished and the pre-war police forces, largely reinforced and very heavily armed, were restored, and various key industries which had been under the control of the trade unions were taken over by the Government (the seizure of the Barcelona Telephone Exchange, which led to the May fighting, was one incident in this process); finally, most important of all, the workers' militias, based on the trade unions, were gradually broken up and redistributed among the new Popular Army, a 'non-political' army on semi-bourgeois lines, with a differential pay rate, a privileged officer-caste, etc., etc. In the special circumstances this was the really decisive step; it happened later in Catalonia than elsewhere because it was there that the revolutionary parties were strongest. Obviously the only guarantee that the workers could have of retaining their winnings was to keep some of the armed forces under their own control. As usual, the breaking-up of the militias was done in the name of military efficiency; and no one denied that a thorough military reorganization was needed. It would, however, have been quite possible to reorganize the militias and make them more efficient while keeping them under direct control of the trade unions; the main purpose of the change was to make sure that the Anarchists did not possess an army of their own. Moreover, the democratic spirit of the militias made them breeding-grounds for revolutionary ideas. The Communists were well aware of this, and inveighed ceaselessly and bitterly against the P.O.U.M. and Anarchist principle of equal pay for all ranks. A general 'bourgeoisification', a deliberate destruction of the equalitarian spirit of the first few months of the revolution, was taking place. All happened so swiftly that people making successive visits to Spain at intervals of a few months have declared that they seemed scarcely to be visiting the same country; what had seemed on the surface and for a brief instant to be a workers' State was changing before one's eyes into an ordinary bourgeois republic with the normal division into rich and poor. By the autumn of 1937 the 'Socialist' Negrin was declaring in public speeches that 'we respect private property', and members of the Cortes who at the beginning of the war had had to fly the country because of their suspected Fascist sympathies were returning to Spain. The whole process is easy to understand if one remembers that it proceeds from the temporary alliance that Fascism, in certain forms, forces upon the bourgeois and the worker. This alliance, known as the Popular Front, is in essential an alliance of enemies, and it seems probable that it must always end by one partner swallowing the other. The only unexpected feature in the Spanish situation--and outside Spain it has caused an immense amount of misunderstanding--is that among the parties on the Government side the Communists stood not upon the extreme Left, but upon the extreme Right. In reality this should cause no surprise, because the tactics of the Communist Party elsewhere, especially in France, have made it clear that Official Communism must be regarded, at any rate for the time being, as an anti-revolutionary force. The whole of Comintern policy is now subordinated (excusably, considering the world situation) to the defence of U.S.S.R., which depends upon a system of military alliances. In particular, the U.S.S.R. is in alliance with France, a capitalist-imperialist country. The alliance is of little use to Russia unless French capitalism is strong, therefore Communist policy in France has got to be anti-revolutionary. This means not only that French Communists now march behind the tricolour and sing the Marseillaise, but, what is more important, that they have had to drop all effective agitation in the French colonies. It is less than three years since Thorez, the Secretary of the French Communist Party, was declaring that the French workers would never be bamboozled into fighting against their German comrades; [Note 4, below] he is now one of the loudest-lunged patriots in France. The clue to the behaviour of the Communist Party in any country is the military relation of that country, actual or potential, towards the U.S.S.R. In England, for instance, the position is still uncertain, hence the English Communist Party is still hostile to the National Government, and, ostensibly, opposed to rearmament. If, however, Great Britain enters into an alliance or military understanding with the U.S.S.R., the English Communist, like the French Communist, will have no choice but to become a good patriot and imperialist; there are premonitory signs of this already. In Spain the Communist 'line' was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that France, Russia's ally, would strongly object to a revolutionary neighbour and would raise heaven and earth to prevent the liberation of Spanish Morocco. The Daily Mail, with its tales of red revolution financed by Moscow, was even more wildly wrong than usual. In reality it was the Communists above all others who prevented revolution in Spain. Later, when the Right-wing forces were in full control, the Communists showed themselves willing to go a great deal further than the Liberals in hunting down the revolutionary leaders. [Note 5, below]

[Note 3. This was why there were so few Russian arms on the Aragon front, where the troops were predominantly Anarchist. Until April 1937 the only Russian weapon I saw--with the exception of some aeroplanes which may or may not have been Russian--was a solitary sub-machine-gun.]

[Note 4. In the Chamber of Deputies, March 1935.]

[Note 5. For the best account of the interplay between the parties on the Government side, see Franz Borkenau's The Spanish Cockpit. This is by a long way the ablest book that has yet appeared on the Spanish war.]

I have tried to sketch the general course of the Spanish revolution during its first year, because this makes it easier to understand the situation at any given moment. But I do not want to suggest that in February I held all of the opinions that are implied in what I have said above. To begin with, the things that most enlightened me had not yet happened, and in any case my sympathies were in some ways different from what they are now. This was partly because the political side of the war bored me and I naturally reacted against the viewpoint of which I heard most--i.e. the P.O.U.M.-I.L.P. viewpoint. The Englishmen I was among were mostly I.L.P. members, with a few C.P. members among them, and most of them were much better educated politically than myself. For weeks on end, during the dull period when nothing was happening round Huesca, I found myself in the middle of a political discussion that practically never ended. In the draughty evil-smelling barn of the farm-house where we were billeted, in the stuffy blackness of dug-outs, behind the parapet in the freezing midnight hours, the conflicting party 'lines' were debated over and over. Among the Spaniards it was the same, and most of the newspapers we saw made the inter-party feud their chief feature. One would have had to be deaf or an imbecile not to pick up some idea of what the various parties stood for.

From the point of view of political theory there were only three parties that mattered, the P.S.U.C., the P.O.U.M., and the C.N.T.-F.A.I., loosely described as the Anarchists. I take the P.S.U.C. first, as being the most important; it was the party that finally triumphed, and even at this time it was visibly in the ascendant.

It is necessary to explain that when one speaks of the P.S.U.C. 'line' one really means the Communist Party 'line'. The P.S.U.C. (Partido Socialista Unificado de Cataluna) was the Socialist Party of Catalonia; it had been formed at the beginning of the war by the fusion of various Marxist parties, including the Catalan Communist Party, but it was now entirely under Communist control and was affiliated to the Third International. Elsewhere in Spain no formal unification between Socialists and Communists had taken place, but the Communist viewpoint and the Right-wing Socialist viewpoint could everywhere be regarded as identical. Roughly speaking, the P.S.U.C. was the political organ of the U.G.T. (Union General de Trabajadores), the Socialist trade unions. The membership of these unions throughout Spain now numbered about a million and a half. They contained many sections of the manual workers, but since the outbreak of war they had also been swollen by a large influx of middle-class members, for in the early 'revolutionary' days people of all kinds had found it useful to join either the U.G.T. or the C.N.T. The two blocks of unions overlapped, but of the two the C.N.T. was more definitely a working-class organization. The P.S.U.C. was therefore a party partly of the workers and partly of the small bourgeoisie --the shopkeepers, the officials, and the wealthier peasants.

The P.S.U.C. 'line' which was preached in the Communist and pro--Communist press throughout the world, was approximately this:

'At present nothing matters except winning the war; without victory in the war all else is meaningless. Therefore this is not the moment to talk of pressing forward with the revolution. We can't afford to alienate the peasants by forcing Collectivization upon them, and we can't afford to frighten away the middle classes who were fighting on our side. Above all for the sake of efficiency we must do away with revolutionary chaos. We must have a strong central government in place of local committees, and we must have a properly trained and fully militarized army under a unified command. Clinging on to fragments of workers' control and parroting revolutionary phrases is worse than useless; it is not merely obstructive, but even counterrevolutionary, because it leads to divisions which can be used against us by the Fascists. At this stage we are not fighting for the dictatorship of the proletariat, we are fighting for parliamentary democracy. Whoever tries to turn the civil war into a social revolution is playing into the hands of the Fascists and is in effect, if not in intention, a traitor.'

The P.O.U.M. 'line' differed from this on every point except, of course, the importance of winning the war. The P.O.U.M. (Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista) was one of those dissident Communist parties which have appeared in many countries in the last few years as a result of the opposition to 'Stalinism'; i.e. to the change, real or apparent, in Communist policy. It was made up partly of ex-Communists and partly of an earlier party, the Workers' and Peasants' Bloc. Numerically it was a small party, [Note 6, below] with not much influence outside Catalonia, and chiefly important because it contained an unusually high proportion of politically conscious members. In Catalonia its chief stronghold was Lerida. It did not represent any block of trade unions. The P.O.U.M. militiamen were mostly C.N.T. members, but the actual party-members generally belonged to the U.G.T. It was, however, only in the C.N.T. that the P.O.U.M. had any influence. The P.O.U.M. 'line' was approximately this:

[Note 6. The figures for the P.O.U.M. membership are given as: July 1936, 10,000; December 1936, 70,000; June 1937, 40,000. But these are from P.O.U.M. sources; a hostile estimate would probably divide them by four. The only thing one can say with any certainty about the membership of the Spanish political parties is that every party over-estimates its own numbers.]

'It is nonsense to talk of opposing Fascism by bourgeois "democracy". Bourgeois "democracy" is only another name for capitalism, and so is Fascism; to fight against Fascism on behalf of "democracy" is to fight against one form of capitalism on behalf of a second which is liable to turn into the first at any moment. The only real alternative to Fascism is workers' control. If you set up any less goal than this, you will either hand the victory to Franco, or, at best, let in Fascism by the back door. Meanwhile the workers must cling to every scrap of what they have won; if they yield anything to the semi--bourgeois Government they can depend upon being cheated. The workers' militias and police-forces must be preserved in their present form and every effort to "bourgeoisify" them must be resisted. If the workers do not control the armed forces, the armed forces will control the workers. The war and the revolution are inseparable.'

The Anarchist viewpoint is less easily defined. In any case the loose term 'Anarchists' is used to cover a multitude of people of very varying opinions. The huge block of unions making up the C.N.T. (Confederacion Nacional de Trabajadores), with round about two million members in all, had for its political organ the F.A.I. (Federacion Anarquista Iberica), an actual Anarchist organization. But even the members of the F.A.I., though always tinged, as perhaps most Spaniards are, with the Anarchist philosophy, were not necessarily Anarchists in the purest sense. Especially since the beginning of the war they had moved more in the direction of ordinary Socialism, because circumstances had forced them to take part in centralized administration and even to break all their principles by entering the Government. Nevertheless they differed fundamentally from the Communists in so much that, like the P.O.U.M., they aimed at workers' control and not a parliamentary democracy. They accepted the P.O.U.M. slogan: 'The war and the revolution are inseparable', though they were less dogmatic about it. Roughly speaking, the C.N.T.-F.A.I. stood for: (i) Direct control over industry by the workers engaged in each industry, e.g. transport, the textile factories, etc.; (2) Government by local committees and resistance to all forms of centralized authoritarianism; (3) Uncompromising hostility to the bourgeoisie and the Church. The last point, though the least precise, was the most important. The Anarchists were the opposite of the majority of so-called revolutionaries in so much that though their principles were rather vague their hatred of privilege and injustice was perfectly genuine. Philosophically, Communism and Anarchism are poles apart. Practically--i.e. in the form of society aimed at--the difference is mainly one of emphasis, but it is quite irreconcilable. The Communist's emphasis is always on centralism and efficiency, the Anarchist's on liberty and equality. Anarchism is deeply rooted in Spain and is likely to outlive Communism when the Russian influence is withdrawn. During the first two months of the war it was the Anarchists more than anyone else who had saved the situation, and much later than this the Anarchist militia, in spite of their indiscipline, were notoriously the best fighters among the purely Spanish forces. From about February 1937 onwards the Anarchists and the P.O.U.M. could to some extent be lumped together. If the Anarchists, the P.O.U.M., and the Left wing of the Socialists had had the sense to combine at the start and press a realistic policy, the history of the war might have been different. But in the early period, when the revolutionary parties seemed to have the game in their hands, this was impossible. Between the Anarchists and the Socialists there were ancient jealousies, the P.O.U.M., as Marxists, were sceptical of Anarchism, while from the pure Anarchist standpoint the 'Trotskyism' of the P.O.U.M. was not much preferable to the 'Stalinism' of the Communists. Nevertheless the Communist tactics tended to drive the two parties together. When the P.O.U.M. joined in the disastrous fighting in Barcelona in May, it was mainly from an instinct to stand by the C.N.T., and later, when the P.O.U.M. was suppressed, the Anarchists were the only people who dared to raise a voice in its defence.

So, roughly speaking, the alignment of forces was this. On the one side the C.N.T.-F.A.I., the P.O.U.M., and a section of the Socialists, standing for workers' control: on the other side the Right-wing Socialists, Liberals, and Communists, standing for centralized government and a militarized army.

It is easy to see why, at this time, I preferred the Communist viewpoint to that of the P.O.U.M. The Communists had a definite practical policy, an obviously better policy from the point of view of the common sense which looks only a few months ahead. And certainly the day-to-day policy of the P.O.U.M., their propaganda and so forth, was unspeakably bad; it must have been so, or they would have been able to attract a bigger mass-following. What clinched everything was that the Communists--so it seemed to me--were getting on with the war while we and the Anarchists were standing still. This was the general feeling at the time. The Communists had gained power and a vast increase of membership partly by appealing to the middle classes against the revolutionaries, but partly also because they were the only people who looked capable of winning the war. The Russian arms and the magnificent defence of Madrid by troops mainly under Communist control had made the Communists the heroes of Spain. As someone put it, every Russian aeroplane that flew over our heads was Communist propaganda. The revolutionary purism of the P.O.U.M., though I saw its logic, seemed to me rather futile. After all, the one thing that mattered was to win the war.

Meanwhile there was the diabolical inter-party feud that was going on in the newspapers, in pamphlets, on posters, in books--everywhere. At this time the newspapers I saw most often were the P.O.U.M. papers La Batalla and Adelante, and their ceaseless carping against the 'counter-revolutionary' P.S.U.C. struck me as priggish and tiresome. Later, when I studied the P.S.U.C. and Communist press more closely, I realized that the P.O.U.M. were almost blameless compared with their adversaries. Apart from anything else, they had much smaller opportunities. Unlike the Communists, they had no footing in any press outside their own country, and inside Spain they were at an immense disadvantage because the press censorship was mainly under Communist control, which meant that the P.O.U.M. papers were liable to be suppressed or fined if they said anything damaging. It is also fair to the P.O.U.M. to say that though they might preach endless sermons on revolution and quote Lenin ad nauseam, they did not usually indulge in personal libel. Also they kept their polemics mainly to newspaper articles. Their large coloured posters, designed for a wider public (posters are important in Spain, with its large illiterate population), did not attack rival parties, but were simply anti--Fascist or abstractedly revolutionary; so were the songs the militiamen sang. The Communist attacks were quite a different matter. I shall have to deal with some of these later in this book. Here I can only give a brief indication of the Communist line of attack.

On the surface the quarrel between the Communists and the P.O.U.M. was one of tactics. The P.O.U.M. was for immediate revolution, the Communists not. So far so good; there was much to be said on both sides. Further, the Communists contended that the P.O.U.M. propaganda divided and weakened the Government forces and thus endangered the war; again, though finally I do not agree, a good case could be made out for this. But here the peculiarity of Communist tactics came in. Tentatively at first, then more loudly, they began to assert that the P.O.U.M. was splitting the Government forces not by bad judgement but by deliberate design. The P.O.U.M. was declared to be no more than a gang of disguised Fascists, in the pay of Franco and Hitler, who were pressing a pseudo-revolutionary policy as a way of aiding the Fascist cause. The P.O.U.M. was a 'Trotskyist' organization and 'Franco's Fifth Column'. This implied that scores of thousands of working-class people, including eight or ten thousand soldiers who were freezing in the front-line trenches and hundreds of foreigners who had come to Spain to fight against Fascism, often sacrificing their livelihood and their nationality by doing so, were simply traitors in the pay of the enemy. And this story was spread all over Spain by means of posters, etc., and repeated over and over in the Communist and pro-Communist press of the whole world. I could fill half a dozen books with quotations if I chose to collect them.

This, then, was what they were saying about us: we were Trotskyists, Fascists, traitors, murderers, cowards, spies, and so forth. I admit it was not pleasant, especially when one thought of some of the people who were responsible for it. It is not a nice thing to see a Spanish boy of fifteen carried down the line on a stretcher, with a dazed white face looking out from among the blankets, and to think of the sleek persons in London and Paris who are writing pamphlets to prove that this boy is a Fascist in disguise. One of the most horrible features of war is that all the war-propaganda, all the screaming and lies and hatred, comes invariably from people who are not fighting. The P.S.U.C. militiamen whom I knew in the line, the Communists from the International Brigade whom I met from time to time, never called me a Trotskyist or a traitor; they left that kind of thing to the journalists in the rear. The people who wrote pamphlets against us and vilified us in the newspapers all remained safe at home, or at worst in the newspaper offices of Valencia, hundreds of miles from the bullets and the mud. And apart from the libels of the inter-party feud, all the usual war-stuff, the tub-thumping, the heroics, the vilification of the enemy--all these were done, as usual, by people who were not fighting and who in many cases would have run a hundred miles sooner than fight. One of the dreariest effects of this war has been to teach me that the Left-wing press is every bit as spurious and dishonest as that of the Right. [Note 7, below] I do earnestly feel that on our side--the Government side--this war was different from ordinary, imperialistic wars; but from the nature of the war-propaganda you would never have guessed it. The fighting had barely started when the newspapers of the Right and Left dived simultaneously into the same cesspool of abuse. We all remember the Daily Mail's poster: 'REDS CRUCIFY NUNS', while to the Daily Worker Franco's Foreign Legion was 'composed of murderers, white-slavers, dope-fiends, and the offal of every European country'. As late as October 1937 the New Statesman was treating us to tales of Fascist barricades made of the bodies of living children (a most unhandy thing to make barricades with), and Mr Arthur Bryant was declaring that 'the sawing-off of a Conservative tradesman's legs' was 'a commonplace' in Loyalist Spain. The people who write that kind of stuff never fight; possibly they believe that to write it is a substitute for fighting. It is the same in all wars; the soldiers do the fighting, the journalists do the shouting, and no true patriot ever gets near a front-line trench, except on the briefest of propaganda-tours. Sometimes it is a comfort to me to think that the aeroplane is altering the conditions of war. Perhaps when the next great war comes we may see that sight unprecedented in all history, a jingo with a bullet-hole in him.

[Note 7. I should like to make an exception of the Manchester Guardian. In connexion with this book I have had to go through the files of a good many English papers. Of our larger papers, the Manchester Guardian is the only one that leaves me with an increased respect for its honesty.]

As far as the journalistic part of it went, this war was a racket like all other wars. But there was this difference, that whereas the journalists usually reserve their most murderous invective for the enemy, in this case, as time went on, the Communists and the P.O.U.M. came to write more bitterly about one another than about the Fascists. Nevertheless at the time I could not bring myself to take it very seriously. The inter-party feud was annoying and even disgusting, but it appeared to me as a domestic squabble. I did not believe that it would alter anything or that there was any really irreconcilable difference of policy. I grasped that the Communists and Liberals had set their faces against allowing the revolution to go forward; I did not grasp that they might be capable of swinging it back.

There was a good reason for this. All this time I was at the front, and at the front the social and political atmosphere did not change. I had left Barcelona in early January and I did not go on leave till late April; and all this time--indeed, till later--in the strip of Aragon controlled by Anarchist and P.O.U.M. troops, the same conditions persisted, at least outwardly. The revolutionary atmosphere remained as I had first known it. General and private, peasant and militiaman, still met as equals; everyone drew the same pay, wore the same clothes, ate the same food, and called everyone else 'thou' and 'comrade'; there was no boss-class, no menial-class, no beggars, no prostitutes, no lawyers, no priests, no boot-licking, no cap-touching. I was breathing the air of equality, and I was simple enough to imagine that it existed all over Spain. I did not realize that more or less by chance I was isolated among the most revolutionary section of the Spanish working class.

So, when my more politically educated comrades told me that one could not take a purely military attitude towards the war, and that the choice lay between revolution and Fascism, I was inclined to laugh at them. On the whole I accepted the Communist viewpoint, which boiled down to saying: 'We can't talk of revolution till we've won the war', and not the P.O.U.M. viewpoint, which boiled down to saying: 'We must go forward or we shall go back.' When later on I decided that the P.O.U.M. were right, or at any rate righter than the Communists, it was not altogether upon a point of theory. On paper the Communist case was a good one; the trouble was that their actual behaviour made it difficult to believe that they were advancing it in good faith. The often-repeated slogan: 'The war first and the revolution afterwards', though devoutly believed in by the average P.S.U.C. militiaman, who honestly thought that the revolution could continue when the war had been won, was eyewash. The thing for which the Communists were working was not to postpone the Spanish revolution till a more suitable time, but to make sure that it never happened. This became more and more obvious as time went on, as power was twisted more and more out of working-class hands, and as more and more revolutionaries of every shade were flung into jail. Every move was made in the name of military necessity, because this pretext was, so to speak, ready-made, but the effect was to drive the workers back from an advantageous position and into a position in which, when the war was over, they would find it impossible to resist the reintroduction of capitalism. Please notice that I am saying nothing against the rank-and-file Communists, least of all against the thousands of Communists who died heroically round Madrid. But those were not the men who were directing party policy. As for the people higher up, it is inconceivable that they were not acting with their eyes open.

But, finally, the war was worth winning even if the revolution was lost. And in the end I came to doubt whether, in the long run, the Communist policy made for victory. Very few people seem to have reflected that a different policy might be appropriate at different periods of the war. The Anarchists probably saved the situation in the first two months, but they were incapable of organizing resistance beyond a certain point; the Communists probably saved the situation in October-December, but to win the war outright was a different matter. In England the Communist war-policy has been accepted without question, because very few criticisms of it have been allowed to get into print and because its general line--do away with revolutionary chaos, speed up production, militarize the army--sounds realistic and efficient. It is worth pointing out its inherent weakness.

In order to check every revolutionary tendency and make the war as much like an ordinary war as possible, it became necessary to throw away the strategic opportunities that actually existed. I have described how we were armed, or not armed, on the Aragon front. There is very little doubt that arms were deliberately withheld lest too many of them should get into the hands of the Anarchists, who would afterwards use them for a revolutionary purpose; consequently the big Aragon offensive which would have made Franco draw back from Bilbao, and possibly from Madrid, never happened. But this was comparatively a small matter. What was more important was that once the war had been narrowed down to a 'war for democracy' it became impossible to make any large-scale appeal for working-class aid abroad. If we face facts we must admit that the working class of the world has regarded the Spanish war with detachment. Tens of thousands of individuals came to fight, but the tens of millions behind them remained apathetic. During the first year of the war the entire British public is thought to have subscribed to various 'aid Spain' funds about a quarter of a million pounds--probably less than half of what they spend in a single week on going to the pictures. The way in which the working class in the democratic countries could really have helped her Spanish comrades was by industrial action--strikes and boycotts. No such thing ever even began to happen. The Labour and Communist leaders everywhere declared that it was unthinkable; and no doubt they were right, so long as they were also shouting at the tops of their voices that' red' Spain was not 'red'. Since 1914-18 'war for democracy' has had a sinister sound. For years past the Communists themselves had been teaching the militant workers in all countries that 'democracy' was a polite name for capitalism. To say first 'Democracy is a swindle', and then 'Fight for democracy!' is not good tactics. If, with the huge prestige of Soviet Russia behind them, they had appealed to the workers of the world in the name not of 'democratic Spain', but of 'revolutionary Spain', it is hard to believe that they would not have got a response.

But what was most important of all, with a non-revolutionary policy it was difficult, if not impossible, to strike at Franco's rear. By the summer of 1937 Franco was controlling a larger population than the Government--much larger, if one counts in the colonies--with about the same number of troops. As everyone knows, with a hostile population at your back it is impossible to keep an army in the field without an equally large army to guard your communications, suppress sabotage, etc. Obviously, therefore, there was no real popular movement in Franco's rear. It was inconceivable that the people in his territory, at any rate the town-workers and the poorer peasants, liked or wanted Franco, but with every swing to the Right the Government's superiority became less apparent. What clinches everything is the case of Morocco. Why was there no rising in Morocco? Franco was trying to set up an infamous dictatorship, and the Moors actually preferred him to the Popular Front Government! The palpable truth is that no attempt was made to foment a rising in Morocco, because to do so would have meant putting a revolutionary construction on the war. The first necessity, to convince the Moors of the Government's good faith, would have been to proclaim Morocco liberated. And we can imagine how pleased the French would have been by that! The best strategic opportunity of the war was flung away in the vain hope of placating French and British capitalism. The whole tendency of the Communist policy was to reduce the war to an ordinary, non-revolutionary war in which the Government was heavily handicapped. For a war of that kind has got to be won by mechanical means, i.e. ultimately, by limitless supplies of weapons; and the Government's chief donor of weapons, the U.S.S.R., was at a great disadvantage, geographically, compared with Italy and Germany. Perhaps the P.O.U.M. and Anarchist slogan: 'The war and the revolution are inseparable', was less visionary than it sounds.

I have given my reasons for thinking that the Communist anti--revolutionary policy was mistaken, but so far as its effect upon the war goes I do not hope that my judgement is right. A thousand times I hope that it is wrong. I would wish to see this war won by any means whatever. And of course we cannot tell yet what may happen. The Government may swing to the Left again, the Moors may revolt of their own accord, England may decide to buy Italy out, the war may be won by straightforward military means--there is no knowing. I let the above opinions stand, and time will show how far I am right or wrong.

But in February 193^ I did not see things quite in this light. I was sick of the inaction on the Aragon front and chiefly conscious that I had not done my fair share of the fighting. I used to think of the recruiting poster in Barcelona which demanded accusingly of passers-by: 'What have you done for democracy ?' and feel that I could only answer:' I have drawn my rations.' When I joined the militia I had promised myself to kill one Fascist--after all, if each of us killed one they would soon be extinct--and I had killed nobody yet, had hardly had the chance to do so. And of course I wanted to go to Madrid. Everyone in the army, whatever his political opinions, always wanted to go to Madrid. This would probably mean exchanging into the International Column, for the P.O.U.M. had now very few troops at Madrid and the Anarchists not so many as formerly.

For the present, of course, one had to stay in the line, but I told everyone that when we went on leave I should, if possible, exchange into the International Column, which meant putting myself under Communist control. Various people tried to dissuade me, but no one attempted to interfere. It is fair to say that there was very little heresy-hunting in the P.O.U.M., perhaps not enough, considering their special circumstances; short of being a pro-Fascist no one was penalized for holding the wrong political opinions. I spent much of my time in the militia in bitterly criticizing the P.O.U.M. 'line', but I never got into trouble for it. There was not even any pressure upon one to become a political member of the party, though I think the majority of the militiamen did so. I myself never joined the party--for which afterwards, when the P.O.U.M. was suppressed, I was rather sorry.

在韦斯卡东边,直到三月底也没有发生任何事情——简直是真正意义上的太平无事,而敌人离我们只有两百米远。法西斯主义者被赶回韦斯卡以后,共和军控制了这部分战线,但并没有急于向前推进,这样就形成了一条口袋状的战线。后来共和军曾被迫向前推进——这在对方火力下可是件让人头疼的事情——不过目前,敌人好象完全不存在,我们的当务之急是对付寒冷和弄到足够的食物。事实上,这一时期的不少事情引起了我的极大兴趣,接下来我将记述其中的一部分。在这里,我将首先从政府军的立场说起,讲述国内的政治形势,并尽可能按事件发生的先后顺序进行。

起初,我忽视了战争的政治意义,直到这时才迫使我不得不注意它。如果你对党派政治的恐怖毫无兴趣,请跳过这些内容不读,正因为如此我才将其中的政治部分列为单独的一章。但事实上,根本不可能单纯地从军事角度来谈论西班牙战争。因为,它首先是一场政治战争。如果不紧扣政府军阵营内部各种政治党派的斗争,那么战争爆发第一年的任何事情都会让人感到无法理解。

在我刚到西班牙以及随后的一段时间里,我对于政治形势既无兴趣,也不甚了解。我只知道这里正在进行着一场战争,但并不清楚这究竟是一种什么性质的战争。如果你问我为什么要参加民兵,我的回答是:“反抗法西斯主义”;如果你问我为什么而战,我的回答是“为了人类共同的尊严”。我赞同《新政治家报》的这一说法:这场战争是为了捍卫文明,反对希特勒支持的布林普斯(Blimps)上校部队的疯狂进攻。巴塞罗那的革命气氛深深地吸引着我,但我并不想去理解它。P.S.U.C.,P.O.U.M.,F.A.I.,C.N.T.,U.G.T.,J.C.I.,J.S.U.,A.I.T.等诸如此类令人摸不着头脑的各种政党和工会的名称,只是让我感到厌烦和愤怒。它们给人的第一印象是西班牙的首字母略缩语似乎正在泛滥成灾。我只知道我参加的是一个名叫P.O.U.M.的组织(其实我只是加入了属于P.O.U.M.的民部队,并未参与他们的其他事情,因为在到达巴塞罗那时碰巧我只带着英国独立工党的一纸介绍信),但我并没有弄清它与其他政治党派之间有着严重差别。在波切洛山,当人们指着左边的位置告诉我“那些人是社会主义者”(意思是P.S.U.C.的人员)时,我感到困惑不解,说道:“难道我们不都是社会主义者吗?”我认为,大家都是拼死战斗的人,居然还存有党派之见这太愚蠢了,我的一贯态度是,“为什么我们不能停止无聊的政治争论而在战争中同心协力并肩战斗?”这当然是反法西斯的正确态度。但这也正是英国报纸正在精心散布的言论,其目的主要是为了不让人们弄清斗争的真实性质。在西班牙,特别是在加泰罗尼亚,实际上,任何人都不可能明确地保持这种态度。无论情愿还是不情愿,每个人迟早都要站到某一边去。因为任何一个即使对政治党派和对立“阵线”全然漠不关心的人,他自己的命运显然也会被无情地牵入其中。作为军人,他们一方面是反对佛朗哥的战士,但另一方面也是两种政治理论激烈斗争中的棋子。当我在山上搜集柴草时,当我在巴塞罗那骚乱中躲避共产党人的机枪扫射时,当我最后在警察的追捕下逃离西班牙时,我总是在想,这是否就是真正的战争,还是《新政治家报》捏造出来的那种战争,——所有这一切对我来说都很特别,因为我是在为马统工党的部队服务,不是站在加联社党的一边。这两套大写字母看起来平常,其实却有天壤之别!

要想理解政府一方的同盟,那就必须回顾战争是如何开始的。7月18日战斗开始后,欧洲每一个反法西斯战士都充满了希望。显然,至少在这里民主与法西斯主义势不两立,因为多年以来所谓民主国家一直在一步一步地向法西斯主义投降。日本被允许在中国的东北为所欲为;希特勒已经攫取了权力,开始屠杀各种政治反对派。墨索里尼轰炸埃塞俄比亚之后,五十三个国家(我认为是五十三个国家)明确地发出了“不干涉”的声音。但出人意料的是,当佛朗哥试图推翻温和的左翼政府时,西班牙人民却站起来反对他。这好象是——或者可能就是——潮流的转向。

然而,有一些事情没有引起普遍的注意。首先,严格说来,不应将佛朗哥与希特勒或墨索里尼相提并论。他所发动的叛乱,基本上属于贵族和教会支持的军事政变,至少在初期是如此,它并不是为了推行法西斯主义,而是为了复辟封建主义。这意味着佛朗哥反对的不仅仅是工人阶级,而且包括各种各样的自由派资产阶级——当这些人以现代形式出现时,他们正是法西斯主义的支持者。更为重要的是,西班牙工人阶级并非像我们在英国那样仅仅以“民主”和“秩序”的名义反对佛朗哥,他们的抵抗运动带有——也可以说包含着——十分明显的革命性质。土地被农民夺取,工厂和几乎所有的交通工具被工会夺占,教堂被拆毁,牧师被赶跑或杀害。而在天主教牧师的欢呼声中,《每日邮报》则把佛朗哥描绘成一个爱国者,使他的国家脱离可怕的“红”祸。

在战争的最初几个月中,佛朗哥真正的反对者不是政府,而是工会。早在起义爆发时,组织起来的城镇工人就号召进行总罢工,并要求分发在斗争中夺取的弹药库中的武器。如果这些仅仅是完全自发和互无联系的行动,佛朗哥也许永远不会进行反击。当然,事情并非必然如此,可至少有理由这样认为。尽管很早就预料到起义的爆发,但政府几乎没有采取任何措施来加以阻止,甚至根本没打算阻止起义。政府表现软弱,态度游移不定,以至于西班牙在一天之内竟更换了三位总理[1]。而且,政府只是勉强地采取一些让工人获得武器以避免形势急转直下的行动,算是对群众的暴力骚乱作出了反应。然而,武器已经扩散开来,在西班牙东部的一些城镇,在一些仍然效忠政府的武装力量(袭击卫队等)的帮助下,主要是通过工人阶级的奋力战斗,终于打败了法西斯主义者。这可能是那些为革命而战的人们所采取的行动——例如,自以为是为了改变现状。在各地的革命中心,据说一天就有三千人战死于大街小巷。男男女女们仅凭手中的雷管和炸药在广场上左冲右突,捣毁了训练有素的士兵用机枪把守的堡垒。法西斯主义者在战略要害部署的机枪阵地被时速六十英里的出租车冲毁。即使从未听说过农民夺取了土地、建立了苏维埃等等,人们也很难相信,作为抵抗运动中坚力量的无政府主义者和社会主义者,其实正在保卫资本主义的民主事业。而在无政府主义者看来,资本主义民主只不过是中央集权化的虚伪工具。

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[1]基罗加、巴里奥斯和希拉尔,前两位拒绝把武器分发给工会。

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与此同时,工人手中掌握着武器,他们在这一时期拒绝交出武器。(据说即使在一年以后,加泰罗尼亚无政府工团主义者仍拥有三万支步枪。)在一些地方,支持法西斯主义的大地主的土地被农民夺取。工业和交通部门出现集体化运动,与之相伴而来的是,人们开始通过成立地方委员会建立了工人政府的雏形,用工人巡逻队取代了支持资本家的旧警察,在工会的基础上建立了工人武装,等等。当然,这一进程并没有在各地同步发展起来,加泰罗尼亚是最先行动起来的。一些地区的地方政府机构几乎没有受到冲击,有的甚至与革命委员会同时并存。在一些地区,无政府主义者建立了不受任何人约束的公社,有的存在了一年之久才被政府镇压下去。在加泰罗尼亚,无政府工团主义者在最初的几个月中掌握了实权,控制了大多数关键性的工业部门。事实上,西班牙所发生的不只是内战,而是革命的开始。西班牙以外的反法西斯主义新闻媒体却将其遮遮掩掩。问题被狭隘地解释为“法西斯主义与民主之间的斗争”,而革命的一面则被尽可能地掩藏起来。在英国,新闻更为集权化,公众更容易受到欺骗,人们公开谈论的只有两种西班牙战争:右翼的称之为基督教爱国者与嗜血的布尔什维克的斗争,左翼的称之为温和派共和人士镇压军事革命。而核心问题则被成功地掩藏起来。

这其中有几个原因。首先,支持法西斯分子的新闻媒体散布了许多骇人听闻的暴行的谎言,善意的宣传毫不怀疑地认为,他们是在帮助西班牙政府,防止西班牙“赤化”。但主要的原因是:除了各国的一些规模较小的革命团体外,整个世界都在下决心防止西班牙出现革命。(西班牙)共产党尤其是这样,它仰仗苏联的支持,全力反对进行革命。这些共产党人的理论是,在这个阶段进行革命必将产生致命的后果,西班牙革命的目标不是由工人来掌握权力,而是在于实现资产阶级民主。特别需要指出的是,为什么“自由派”资本家也持有这种观点。外国资本在西班牙有着大量的投资。例如,巴塞罗那公共运输公司就有上千万的英国资本,而工会却控制了加泰罗尼亚的所有交通。如果革命继续推进的话,将不会给予外国资本以任何补偿,即使给予,也少得可怜;如果资产阶级共和派占上风,则将能够保证外国投资的安全。因为如果革命被粉碎,就会使事情大大简单化,如同什么革命也没有发生过一样。这样,每个事件的真实意义就可以被掩藏起来,权力从工会向中央政府的每次转移都可能意味着那是军事改组的必要步骤。最后产生的结果非常奇特。在西班牙境外,几乎没有人知道那里发生了革命,而在西班牙境内,则没有人怀疑那里发生了革命。即使处在共产党人控制之下的、或多或少地执行反对革命的政策的加联社党的报纸,也都在谈论“我们的光荣革命”。与此同时,一些外国共产党人的新闻媒体则在高喊任何地方都没有出现革命的迹象,并没有发生夺取工厂、建立工人委员会之类的事件,或者,换言之,即使发生了,也“不具有任何政治上的意义”。用《每日工人报》(1936年8月6日)的话来说,只有那些彻头彻尾颠倒黑白的人才辉说西班牙人正在进行社会革命,或者说正在进行资产阶级革命以外的任何革命。相反,胡安?洛佩兹,一位巴伦西亚政府的成员,在1937年2月宣称,“西班牙人正在抛头颅洒热血,不是为了民主共和国和宪法文本,而是为了……革命。”如此看来,那些所谓彻头彻尾颠倒黑白的人也包括政府官员,而我们正是为政府而战的。一些外国反法西斯报纸甚至附和这类可怜巴巴的谎言,佯称教堂只是在被法西斯占为堡垒时才会受到攻击。事实上,各类的教堂遭受破坏乃是势在必然,因为这很容易被理解,西班牙教堂是资本家社交频繁的场所之一。在西班牙的六个月中,我只见到过两座未受破坏的教堂,除了马德里的一两座新教教堂外,其他教堂直到1937年7月才被允许重新开放和举行仪式。

但是,这比只是革命的开始而非终结。工人,自然是加泰罗尼亚的工人,可能还有其他地方的工人,即使有能力这样做,他们也没有去推翻或完全取代政府。他们显然不能这样做,因为佛朗哥尚在门前叫战,相当一部分中间阶层还依附在他们那边。国家处于转型状态,要么向社会主义方向发展,要么回到往常的资本主义共和国时期。农民占据了绝大部分土地,他们想保住这些土地,不让佛朗哥获胜,所有的大讴歌能够业都已经被集体化了。然而是继续实行集体化,还是重新引入资本主义,最终要看哪一方掌权。起初,不管是中央政府,还是加泰罗尼亚自治政府都可以明确声称字代表工人阶级。中央政府由左翼社会主义者卡巴列罗领导,包括代表劳工总会(社会主义工人联合会)和全国劳工联盟(无政府主义者控制的工团主义联盟)的部长。加泰罗尼亚自治政府主要由工会代表组成,实际上一度被反法西斯防务委员会[1]取代。后来,防务委员会解散,自治政府重组,以便代表工会和各种左翼政党。但随后政府的每次改组都是向右翼方向发展。首先是马统工党被清除出自治政府,六个月后卡巴列罗被右翼社会主义者罗格林取代,不久全国劳工联盟被挤出政府,然后是劳工总会,接着是全国劳工联盟被自治政府推出门外,最后,即战争和革命爆发一年以后,政府完全由右翼社会主义者、自由派人士和共产党人组成。

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[1]ComitéCentraldeMiliciasAntifascistas.代表按比例从各组织成员中选出,九名代表代表工会,三名代表加泰罗尼亚自由党,两名代表各种马克思主义政党(马统工党、西班牙共产党人,等等)。

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全面右转开始于1936年10到11月,这时苏联开始向西班牙政府提供武器,权力从无政府主义者手中转到共产党人手中。除了苏联和墨西哥,其他国家都没有以行之有效的方式来挽救共和国政府。墨西哥显然不能大量提供武器,苏联相应地处于支配地位。人们对下述说法没有丝毫怀疑:“防止革命,否则你就得不到武器。”反对革命的第一步是将马统工党从加泰罗尼亚自治政府中驱逐出去,这是在苏联的命令下采取的行动。尽管有人否认苏联政府直接施加了压力,但这无关宏旨,因为可以说当时各国共产党都必须听苏联的。无可否认的是,西班牙共产党是主要的推动者,先是反对马统工党,后来反对无政府主义者和卡巴列罗派的社会主义者,直至全面推行反对革命的政策。一旦苏联进行干预,共产党人的胜利就有了保证。其一,他们对苏联提供武器感激不尽,而且共产党事实上看起来能够赢得战争胜利,特别是在国际纵队到达之后该呢感是如此,这些都极大地提高了共产党的声望。其二,苏联提供的武器源源而至,共产党及其盟党却甚少将其交给他们的政治对手。[1]其三,共产党人所宣称的非革命政策,能够吸引所有那些深受极端主义者恐吓的人。例如,可以轻易地团结富裕农民反对无政府主义者的集体化政策。其党员人数迅速增长,主要是店主、官员、军官、富裕农民等中产阶层中快速发展。战争基本上是一场三角斗争。与佛朗哥的战斗仍在继续,但政府的另一个目标却是夺回工会手中掌握的权力。这主要是通过采取一系列细微的,但从总体上来看却又很精明的行动来完成的,也就是像某些人所说的令人听起来刺耳的政策。直到1937年5月都没有出现明显的、全面的反革命活动,几乎不需要使用武力。在一种无须过多解释的观点影响之下,工人总是被迫就范:“如果你不这样做或那样做,我们将输掉战争。”毫无疑问,无论如何,凡是需要采取军事行动的事情,工人早在1936年就已经完成了。当然这一观点不言自明,因为革命派政党最不希望见到的就是战争的失败:如果战争失败,那么所谓民主和革命、社会主义和无政府主义都将变成毫无意义的词语。无政府主义者是唯一举足轻重的革命派别,却被迫一步一步地后退。集体化进程受到压制,地方委员会被废除,工人巡逻队被禁止活动,战前的警察队伍被恢复并被迅速扩充、添加装备,工会控制的各种主要工业部门被政府接管(占领巴塞罗那电话局,并由此引发五月战斗,就是其间发生的事情)。最后,具有重要意义的是,工会佳丽的工人民兵渐渐被解散,并被改编到新建的人民军中去,成为半资产阶级阵线一支“非政治化”的军队,这支军队有不同的工资级别、不同的军阶等。在特定的情况下,这实际上是具有决定意义的一个步骤。不过这在加泰罗尼亚要比其他地方发生得晚,因为那里的革命团体最为强大。显然,工人想要确保他们的胜利,唯一的办法是保持自己控制的武装力量。通常,解散民兵是以提高军事效率的名义来进行的,因为任何人都无法否认需要进行全面的军事改组。其实,民兵组织完全可以在工会的直接控制之下进行改编,并提高他们的效率。实行这种变革的主要目的是为了不让无政府主义者继续拥有自己的军队。况且,民兵组织中的民主精神极易使之成为革命思想的温床。共产党人非常清楚这一点,猛烈抨击和坚决反对马统工党和无政府主义者坚持的所有人同等待遇的原则。当时出现的全面“资产阶级化”的运动,就是为了故意破坏革命初期的平均主义精神。这一切发生得如此迅速,以至于在几个月内多次到过西班牙的人,都说他们所到的几乎不像是同一个国家。它已从一个至少在外表上显而易见的工人国家,变成了一个贫富差别鲜明的资产阶级共和国。1937年秋,“社会主义者”罗格林公开宣称“我们尊重私有财产”。战争初期被认为是同情法西斯而逃到国外的议员门现在又重新回到了西班牙。

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[1]这就是为什么在阿拉贡前线几乎没有苏联武器的原因,那里的部队主要是无政府主义者。直到1937年4月,我所见到的唯一的苏联武器是一挺机关枪,有些飞机可能是苏联生产的,也可能不是。

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如果联想到这个过程始于法西斯主义以某种形式对资产阶级和工人施加影响从而使他们暂时联合的话,整个过程就很容易理解了。这种联合被称作“人民阵线”,基本上是敌对派别之间的联合,它似乎总是以一方吃掉另一方而告结束。在政府的各个派别之中,共产党人不代表极左派,而是代表极右派,这是西班牙局势唯一出人意料的地方,这在西班牙之外的国家产生了很多误解。实际上,这毫不令人感到奇怪,因为在其他地方,特别是在法国,那里的共产党明确表示,真正的共产主义暂时必须被当做一直反对革命的力量。共产国际的所有政策均从属于保卫苏联(考虑到当时的世界形势,这是可以理解的),这就需要建立相应的军事联盟体系。特别是苏联与资本主义——帝国主义国家法国结盟。这种结盟其实对苏联于事无补,除非法国资本主义强大,所以法国共产党的政策是反对革命的。因此,这不仅意味着法国共产党如今要在三色旗下唱着马赛曲前进,而且更为重要的是,他们必须终止在法国殖民地进行的所有卓有成效的宣传。法共总书记多列士曾经宣布法国工人决不受骗去与德国的同志进行斗争[1],然而没过三年时间,他就变成了法国最高调的爱国主义者之一。任何国家共产党人的行为,均与该国的对苏军事关系(不管是真实的还是潜在的)息息相关。例如,在英国这种关系还不明确,英国共产党仍然对国民政府持有敌意,公开反对重新武装。然而,如果英国与苏联结盟或者建立军事上的互信关系,英国共产党人就会像法国共产党人一样别无选择,只得成为虔诚的爱国主义者和帝国主义者,这种迹象早已存在。苏联的盟友法国将坚决反对邻国进行革命,将竭尽全力防止西班牙属国摩洛哥的解放,西班牙共产党人“阵线”毫无疑问会受到这一事实的影响。据传,《每日邮报》接受了莫斯科红色革命的资助,坚持错误道路比平常任何时候都更加有恃无恐。实际上,西班牙共产党是最先起来防止革命的。当右翼完全控制政权之后,他们表现得比自由派更愿意对革命的领导人穷追猛打。[2]

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[1]1935年3月在议会下院的发言。

[2]弗朗兹?博克瑙的《西班牙战场》对政府与各党派的相互影响进行了精彩的描述,请参阅。这是迄今为止有关西班牙战争的最好著作。

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我试图勾画西班牙革命第一年的大致情形,因为这会有助于更清楚地理解任何其他时期的形势。但我这并不是说我在二月份就已经形成了上述所有观点。首先,最能启发我的事情当时还没有出现,在某种程度上,我的同情心与现在的情况完全不同。这一方面是因为战争的政治意义使我感到厌倦,我自然而然地强烈反对我听得最多的观点,如马统工党、英国独立工党的观点。我所加入的民兵组织中的英国人大多是英国工党的成员,其中还有一些共产党人,他们大多数比我自己接受了更好的政治教育。在韦斯卡前线无所事事、百无聊赖的日子里,我曾被迫连续几周置身于没完没了的政治辩论之中。在我们所驻扎的农家透风发臭的谷仓里、在闷热昏暗的防空洞中、在夜半冰凉的胸墙后面,对立的“阵线”各派一再进行激烈辩论。西班牙人也是如此,我所见到的大多数报纸都表现出了他们长期进行党派斗争的主要特色,为了不附和各种党派所坚持的某些观点,人们不得不装聋作哑。

从政治理论的观点来看,加联社党、马统工党、全国劳工联盟——F.A.I.三个政党可以大致被称作无政府主义政党。我先是跟随加联社党,它是最重要的政党,也是最终取得胜利的政党,当时就看得好粗它处于上升势头。

需要解释的是,当人们说到加联社党“阵线”时,人们实际上说的是共产党“阵线”。加联社党,它组建于战争初期,融合了包括加泰罗尼亚共产党在内的各种马克思主义政党,但现在它完全处于共产党控制之下,依附于第三国际。在西班牙其他地方并没有出现社会主义者和共产党人之间的正式联合,但共产党人和右翼社会主义者的观点都被认为是一样的。大致说来,加泰罗尼亚联合社会党是劳工总会的政治机构,是社会主义工会。在全西班牙,这些工会的会员约有一百五十万。其中包括各种体力劳动者,但因战争爆发,大量的中间阶层也加入进来。在“革命”初期,各阶层的人都发现加入劳工总会或全国劳工联盟颇有用处。这两个工会集团互相重叠,但在两者之中,全国劳工联盟更明显地表现为工人阶级组织,加联社党则是既代表工人阶级又代表店主、官员和富裕农民等小资产阶级的政党。

加联社党“阵线”曾在全世界的共产党和支持共产党的新闻媒体上展开宣传。其基本内容是:

“现阶段的首要任务是赢得战争,除了胜利,战争中的一切都毫无意义。因此现在不是谈论推进革命的时刻。我们不能通过集体化来脱离农民,我们不能吓跑正在为我们进行战斗的中间阶层。为了提高效率,我们必须制止革命的混乱。我们必须建立强大的中央政府来取代地方委员会,我们必须拥有训练有素、全副武装、指挥统一的军队。执迷于工人的部分掌权和对革命词句鹦鹉学舌将未受其益,反受其害,这将不仅会阻碍革命的发展,而且会出现反革命,因为它会产生分裂,这将是法西斯主义者用来对付我们的办法。现阶段我们不是为进行无产阶级专政而进行斗争,我们是为实现议会民主而进行斗争。谁如果想把内战变成社会主义革命,谁就是让法西斯主义得益,实际上就是叛徒,哪怕不是有意为之。”

当然,除了赢得战争胜利的重要性外,马统工党“阵线”与此完全不同。马统工党是一个持不同政见的共产党。这种共产党,只是最近几年来因为反对“斯大林主义”而在一些国家中出现的,也就是说,他们反对在表面上或实际上改变共产党的政策。马统工党中,既有退党的共产党人,也有工农集团这个早期政党的党员。从党员数量来看,这是一个小党[1],在加泰罗尼亚之外几乎没有什么影响,其重要性在于党员的政治觉悟非常高。它在加泰罗尼亚的据点是莱里达。它并不代表任何工会集团。马统工党的民兵主要是全国劳工联盟的成员,但真正的党员一般属于劳工总会。然而,马统工党只有在全国劳工联盟中才有一些影响。马统工党“阵线”的基本主张是:

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[1]马克思主义统一工人党党员人数据说如下:1936年7月10000人;1936年12月70000人;1937年6月40000人。但这是来自马克思主义统一工人党的数据,对手的估计是这些数字需要除以四。人们唯一可以肯定地说,每个西班牙政党都高估了自己党员的人数。

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“谈论用资产阶级‘民主’来反对法西斯主义只是一句空话。资产阶级‘民主’只是另一种形式的资本主义,法西斯主义亦然。以‘民主’的名义反对法西斯主义就是一种形式的资本主义反对另一种形式的资本主义,前一种形式的资本主义在任何时候都很容易转化成后一种形式的资本主义。唯一真正能替代法西斯主义的是由工人阶级进行统治。如果你不以此为目标,要么是把胜利拱手送给佛朗哥,要么最多是从后门领进来法西斯主义。与此同时,工人必须牢牢掌握自己获得的每一个胜利。如果他们把任何东西交给半资产阶级政府,那么他们就上当受骗了。工人民兵和警察必须以现有形式保存下来,他们必须抵制任何‘资产阶级化’的行动。如果工人阶级不控制武装力量,武装力量就会控制工人阶级。战争和革命不可分离开来。”

无政府主义者的观点无法轻易加以界定。在任何情况下,泛泛而谈的“无政府主义”一词经常被用来涵括许多不同的观点。全国劳工联盟是通过各种联合形式组成的一个大集团,越有两百万成员,有自己的政治组织F.A.I.,它实际上是一个无政府主义组织。但即使是是F.A.I.的成员,虽然总是和大多数西班牙人一样带有些微的无政府主义哲学色彩,也并非必然就是纯粹意义上的无政府主义。特别是从战争爆发以来,他们更多的是朝着社会主义的方向发展,因为环境迫使他们参加中央政府,甚至背离了他们参加政府时主张的一些原则。不过,他们与共产党人有着天壤之别。就像马统工党一样,他们的目标是工人阶级掌握政权,而不是实行议会民主。他们接受马统工党的“战争和革命不可分离”的口号,虽然他们对此并不那么教条。大致说来,全国劳工联盟、F.A.I.主张:(1)让从事工业生产的工人来直接控制工业,如交通、纺织等;(2)由地方委员会来掌管政府,抵制各种形式的中央集权主义;(3)对资产阶级和教会采取不妥协的敌对态度。最后一点虽然最不准确,却最为重要。无政府主义者反对大多数所谓的革命,虽然他们的原则很模糊,但他们真真切切地痛恨特权和不公正。从哲学上来看,共产主义和无政府主义截然相反。实际上,在社会形式的目标方面,这种差别主要是各自强调的重点不同,但完全无法调和。共产党人总是强调中央集权和效率,无政府主义者则强调自由和平等。无政府主义在西班牙根深蒂固,在苏联的影响减弱时,可能超过了共产主义。在战争的最初两个月,正是无政府主义者而不是其他任何人力挽狂澜。尽管既无组织也无纪律,无政府主义的民兵却仍以西班牙本土部队最佳战士的名声而著称。大约从1937年2月以来,无政府主义者和马统工党得以在某种程度上结合在一起。如果无政府主义者、马统工党和左翼社会主义者一开始就有意联合起来,并执行较为现实的政策,战争的历史就可能完全不同。但在战争初期革命派似乎掌握了政权的情况下,这是不可能实现的事情。在无政府主义者和社会主义者之间,向来就互相嫉妒;作为马克思主义者,马统工党对无政府主义持怀疑态度;而从纯粹的无政府主义立场来看,马统工党的“托洛茨基主义”,还不如共产党人的“斯大林主义”。不过,共产党人的策略是推动两个党走到一起。马统工党在五月巴塞罗那代价惨重的战争中,主要是出于本能站到了全国劳工联盟一边。后来,马统工党被镇压,唯有无政府主义者敢于替他们说话。

因此,大致说来,各种政治党派力量的联盟就是这样的状况。一方面,全国劳工联盟、F.A.I.、马统工党和一部分社会主义者代表工人控制部分权力,另一方面,右翼社会主义者、自由派人士和共产党人则代表中央政府及其军事力量。

这时,大家就能明白了,为什么我赞成共产党人的观点,而不是马统工党的观点。共产党人有明确的行动方针,从常识来看显然是一种更好的政策,它预见到了几个月以后的事情。自然不必说,马统工党那种只顾眼前的短视政策和他们的宣传之类,全都糟糕透顶。一切都注定了必然如此。否则他们完全有可能吸引更多的群众跟随他们。具有决定作用的是,共产党人能够灵活适应战争的进程,而我们和无政府主义者则几乎一成不变,至少在我看来就是这样。这也是当时人们的普遍感觉。共产党人吸引中间阶层反对革命,即获得了权力,又迅速发展了党员,在人们看来他们是唯一能够赢得胜利的政党。苏联提供的武器和主要由共产党人领导下的部队在马德里的顽强守卫,使共产党人成为西班牙的英雄。正如有人所说的那样,从我们头顶上飞过的每一架苏联飞机都是共产党人的宣传品。在我看来,马统工党的纯粹革命主义,虽然合乎逻辑,但却不会有什么结果。毕竟,最重要的事情是赢得战争。

与此同时,激烈的党派斗争也在报纸、小册子、海报、书本上进行,攻击性的言辞无处不有。这时我看得最多的报纸是马统工党的报纸LaBatallaandAdelante(《战斗》和《前进》),它们对加联社党的“反革命”吹毛求疵、没完没了,这让我感到它们过于自以为是,令人生厌。后来,我更自信地研究了加联社党和共产党的报纸,我觉得,马统工党和他们的对手相比,几乎无可责备。最重要的问题在于,他们实在缺少更多的机会。与共产党人不同,他们在国外的新闻媒体上毫无立足之地,在西班牙国内也处于罕见的劣势,由于新闻审查主要为共产党人所左右,这就意味着,如果马统工党的报纸刊登了任何所谓有破坏性的消息,那就很容易遭到查禁或课以罚金。就马统工党而言,比较公允的评价应该是:尽管他们总是不厌其烦地宣扬革命、反反复复引述列宁的语录和许多不相干的言论,但他们一般并不进行人身攻击。他们主要利用报纸发表文章进行论战。他们设计大幅彩色海报是为了扩大对公众的影响(海报在西班牙非常重要,因为大多数人是文盲),而不是为了向自己的对手发动攻击,其内容多只是宣传反法西斯或抽象的革命。民兵们所唱的那些歌曲也属于这类宣传。这与共产党人的攻击完全不是一回事。我将在本书后面的章节讨论其中的一些问题。在这里,我只想简要说明一下共产党人的进攻方针。

从表面上看,共产党人和马统工党之间的斗争只是一种策略之争。马统工党赞同进行直接革命,共产党人则反对这样做。在这方面,涉及双方的很多问题均需论及。共产党人认为,马统工党的宣传分化和削弱了政府力量,因此加大了战争的危险。对此,我虽然始终不赞成,可仍认为这毕竟是一个好主义。但是,观测的人策略的奇特性也就显露出来了。他们开始宣称马统工党分裂政府力量并不是由于判断错误,而是故意为之。起初只是试探性地说一说,不久就大声地嚷嚷起来。马统工党被说成只不过是一帮伪装的法西斯主义者,他们受到佛朗哥和希特勒支持,他们的假革命政策只是支援法西斯事业的一种方式。它是一个“托洛茨基主义者”的组织和“佛朗哥”的第五纵队。这就等于说,成千上万的工人群众,包括八千或一万个在前线战壕里饱尝艰辛的战士,数以百计的来到西班牙抗击法西斯主义并不惜为此牺牲生命和国籍的外国人,都只是支持敌人的叛徒。这种蓄意编造的故事,通过海报等各种方式在西班牙各地广泛传播,并在许多国外共产党人或支持者的新闻媒体上再三出现。如果我这些都搜集起来,恐怕仅引语就会塞满好几本书。

这就是他们对我们的抨击:我们是托洛茨基主义者、法西斯主义者、叛徒、谋杀犯、胆小鬼、间谍等等。我承认这令人不快,特别是想到某些人故意捏造了这些罪名。看到一个十五六岁的西班牙男孩被用担架从前线抬下来,从包裹着的毯子中露出惨白的脸,再想到伦敦和巴黎那些圆滑世故的人正在写小册子证明这个男孩是一个伪装的法西斯分子,这实在令人感到不是滋味。战争的最恐怖的特征之一,就是煽动战争的那些宣传、叫嚣、谎言和仇恨,全都出自从来不上前线作战的那些人之口。我在前线认识的加联社党民兵,我从国际纵队那里认识的观测的人,他们从没认为我是托洛茨基主义者或叛徒,只有远在后方的新闻记者才会对许多事情信口雌黄、妄加评论。那些人写小册子反对我们,以及在报纸上辱骂我们的人,远离枪林弹雨、泥泞沼泽的战场何止数百英里,大多悠闲自在地待在家中,最多也就是来到巴伦西亚的报馆里侃大山。除了党派之间的长期斗争和诽谤外,所有常习的战争材料、英雄故事和敌意的污蔑——一如既往,差不多都是那些从不参加战斗,或战斗一旦打响就狂逃百里的人编造完成的。这场战争最阴暗的影响之一,就是让我认识到左翼新闻媒体在每一个方向都和右翼的一样弄虚作假、虚伪透顶。[1]我真切地感受到,在我们这一边,即政府这一边,这场战争完全不同于普通的帝国主义战争,但战争的宣传却让你永远无法弄清其本质。战争刚一开始,左翼和右翼的报纸就仿佛同时跳入同一个相互辱骂的污水坑之中。我们都记得,《每日邮报》的海报说“左派虐待修女”,而《每日工人报》说佛朗哥的外国军团是由杀人犯、白奴贩子、瘾君子、欧洲各国的人渣组成。直到1937年10月,《新政治家》还说法西斯分子用活蹦乱跳的儿童筑成路障(这样的路障材料可真不是随手可取的),阿瑟?布赖恩特先生宣称,在忠诚的西班牙人中,要“锯掉一名保守商人的腿”是“一件平常事”。写这种文字的人从不参加战斗,可能他们以为写作已经足以替代战斗。在所有的战争中都是如此,战士打仗,记者叫唤;除了短暂的宣传旅行外,自诩真正的爱国者从不在前线的战壕里停留。想到飞机正在改变战争的局面,这倒有时让我感到快慰无比。在下一次大战来临时,我们也许可以看到史无前例的景象:一名弹片穿身的沙文主义者。

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[1]我把《曼彻斯特卫报》作为一个例外来看待。在与本书有关的工作中,我查阅了许多英文报纸的档案。在我们的大报中,《曼彻斯特卫报》是唯一让我对它的诚实倍加敬仰的报纸。

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在新闻记者看来,这场战争和其他战争一样喧嚣纷争。仅存的差别,是记者并不会对敌人进行最恶毒的咒骂,而随着时间的推移,反而是共产党人和马统工党之间开始相互发动更厉害的文攻,而且远远超过对付法西斯主义者的激烈程度。不过,那时我并未让自己太过当真。这种党派间的长期争斗确实让人厌烦,但在我看来,只不过是一种内部的激烈争吵而已。我不相信这会改变任何事情,也不相信双方的政策差异真的到了不可调和的程度。我认为,共产党人和自由派人士尽管反对革命向前发展,却无力把革命拉回来。

对于这一点,我有充分的理由。在这期间我一直待在前线,前线的社会政治气氛没有发生变化。在我一月处理开巴塞罗那到前线、直到四月底离开前线这段时间里——实际上也许持续到更晚一些时候——阿拉贡一带都是由无政府主义者和马统工党的民兵部队控制的,这种局面一直持续下来,至少表面上是这样的。革命氛围一如我最初了解的那样。将军和士兵、农民和民兵仍然平等相待,每个人都拿同样的薪金,穿同样的衣服,吃同样的食物,称别人为“你”和“同志”,没有老板,没有仆人,没有乞丐,没有妓女,没有律师,没有神职人员,没有卑躬屈膝,没有脱帽致敬。我呼吸着平等的空气,我甚至简单地以为西班牙各地都是如此。我没有意识到,其实我只是碰巧置身于西班牙工人阶级最革命的队伍里。

所以,当政治上比我接受了更多教育的同志告诉我,不能只根据军事态度来评价一场战争,因为这种态度仅处于革命和法西斯主义之间时,我真想嘲笑他们。总体上来看,我接受共产党人的观点,他们一针见血地说,“不赢得战争,我们就不能谈论革命”;我并不接受马统工党的观点,他们也一针见血地说,“我们必须前进,否则我们就会后退。”后来,我渐渐地认为马统工党的观点是正确的,无论如何至少比共产党人的观点正确,这并不完全是根据理论推导出来的。如果只是纸上谈兵,共产党人的情况会是一个好榜样,麻烦的是他们的实际行动使人们很难相信他们是出于真正的信仰才这么做的。“战争第一,革命其次”是一个再三出现的口号,普通的加联社党民兵虔诚地相信这一口号。他们发自内心地认为,打赢战争之后革命会继续下去。其次,这个口号只是一句空话。共产党人努力争取的不是把西班牙革命推延到更适宜的时候,而是确保它永不发生。随着时间的流逝,随着权力越来越远离工人阶级的控制,随着越来越多各阶层革命人士被投进监狱,事情也就变得越来越明显。每一项变动都是以军事需要为名来进行的,因为这个借口是现成的,而结果总是把工人从有利位置上赶走,等战争结束的时候,他们才会发现自己已经没有办法抵制重新引入资本主义制度。请注意,我并不是在对一般的普通共产党人说三道四,也没有对在马德里战斗中英勇牺牲的数千名共产党人有丝毫的不敬。因为这些人都没有直接参与制定党的政策。至于那些身居党内高位的人,人们很难相信他们不是在十分清醒的情况下采取行动的。

然而,即使革命失败了,争取战争的胜利也是值得的。我终于开始怀疑,最终是否能因西班牙共产党人的政策而赢得胜利。几乎没有人能从中得出结论:不同的政策也许适合于不同阶段的战争。无政府主义者也许在最初两个月挽救了局面,但在某个节点之后,他们没有能力继续组织抵抗。共产党人可能在10到12月期间挽救了局面,但要赢得战争那还得另作别论。在英国,共产党人的战争主张被无可争议地接受下来,因为报纸上几乎不允许出现批评意见,因为消除革命的混乱,加速生产,部队实行军事化,这些一般路线乍听起来是现实的、有效的。但指出其内在的问题也是必要的。

要想掌控革命的每一时期的发展趋势,使战争尽可能像一次普通的战争,那就必须放弃实际存在的战争机会。我已经描述了我们在阿拉贡前线是如何被武装又不被武装的情形。几乎不用怀疑,武器被蓄意收回,以免过多的武器流入无政府主义者手中,因为他们日后会把这些武器用于革命活动。结果呢,从阿拉贡发起的强大攻势,本来可以迫使佛朗哥从毕尔巴鄂甚至从马德里后退,可是这根本没有发生。相对而言,这些也许只是一桩桩小事。更重要的是,一旦战争被狭义地理解为“争取民主的战争”,那就难以吸引国外工人阶级的大规模支援。如果直面这一个事实,我们就必须承认世界各地的工人阶级对西班牙战争认识不一。尽管已有数万人奔赴西班牙加入战斗,但在他们的身后更有千百万人无动于衷。在西班牙战争爆发的第一年,据说英国公众为各种“援助西班牙”的基金捐款共二十五万英镑,其中近一半在一周内就被用于制作各种宣传海报。罢工和联合抵制等产业行动是民主国家工人阶级声援自己的西班牙同志的切实可行的行动方式。但这样的事情从来就没有发生过。各地工党和共产党领袖都声称这是不可思议的,毫无疑问,只要他们仍在高叫“红色”的西班牙并不是“红色的”,他们就是正确的。自从1914到1918年“争取民主的战争”以来就存在着一种用心险恶的声音。多年之后,这些共产党人还在劝导好战的工人:“民主”是资本主义的雅称。先说“民主是个骗局”,然后再说“为民主而战”,这并不是一种好的策略。由于得到大名鼎鼎的苏联的支持,他们向全世界的工人呼吁支持“西班牙革命”而不是“西班牙民主”,很难相信他们不会获得反应。

但更为重要的是,采取非革命的政策手段打击佛朗哥的后方,即使不是完全不可能,也是困难重重。到1937年夏天,佛朗哥控制的人口超过了政府,如果把殖民地计算在内的话更是远远超过政府,他控制的军队也和政府掌握的军队大致相当。众所周知,只要后方存在敌对的民众,就不得不派出相当数量的部队去驻守战略交通要道、镇压各种阴谋破坏活动等,这样就不可能向战场派遣更多的军队。然而,在佛朗哥的后方,显然没有出现真正意义上的群众运动。实在令人难以置信,在佛朗哥控制的地区,无论城镇的工人,还是贫穷的农民,人们都会真的喜欢或者需要佛朗哥。事实上,伴随着每一次向右翼靠拢,政府具有的优势也变得越来越不明显。摩洛哥的例子就能说明一切。为什么摩洛哥没有发生起义?佛朗哥正在企图建立声名狼藉的独裁制度,而摩洛哥人宁可接受佛朗哥的统治,也不愿接受人民阵线政府!最显而易见的事实是,没有人在摩洛哥发动起义,因为这样做就意味着把革命置于战争之上。当然,为了让摩洛哥人相信政府这边的诚意,最重要的还是让他们真正获得解放。我们可以想象一下,法国人对此会感到多么快意!这场战争中最重要的战略机遇,在于打破人们对于英法资本主义的空想。共产党人的政策倾向是,尽量让这场战争发展成为一种普通的、非革命的战争,而这种政策倾向必然会使政府接连遭受重挫。像这类战争,必须要通过加强武器装备才能取得胜利,例如,最终靠的是源源不断的武器供给。苏联是西班牙政府武器的主要捐赠国。但它与意大利和德国相比,地理位置却十分不利。这一切也使马统工党和无政府主义者主张的“战争和革命不可分离”的前景也许比听起来更加虚无缥缈。

西班牙共产党反对革命的政策是错误的,我已经说明了自己的理由,但就它对战争的影响来看,我并不希望我的判断是正确的。我一再希望这一判断是错误的。我希望这场战争可以以任何方式来取得胜利。当然,我们无法预料可能还会发生哪些事情。政府也许再次转向左翼,摩洛哥人也许能够团结一致争取解放,英国人也许决定收买意大利,战争也许只要直接通过军事途径就能或获得胜利,——所有这一切全都不得而知。我希望上述观点成立,时间将会证明我的这些判断是分毫不爽或谬之千里。

然而,直到1937年2月,我也根本没有看到事情是在朝哪个方向发展。我对阿拉贡前线的沉默寂静感到烦闷不已,我觉得自己没有完成反法西斯的战斗任务。我常常想到巴塞罗那的那张征兵海报,它诘问过路人:“你为民主做了什么?”想到这里,我只能回答:“我已经尽力而为了。”在刚刚加入民兵那会儿,我曾希望自己能够消灭一名法西斯分子,——毕竟只要我们每个人都能杀死一名法西斯分子,他们就会很快被消灭掉——可我至今也没有杀死一个法西斯分子,而且几乎没有任何这样的机会。我当然也想去马德里。无论政治观点如何,军队中的每个人都希望前往马德里参加战斗。这可能意味着加入国际纵队,因为那时马统工党在马德里几乎没有部队,无政府主义者在那里的部队也不再有以前那么多了。

当然,现在人们只能待在阿拉贡前线,但我告诉每一个人,等到我们离开这里时,也许会加入国际纵队,那将意味着接受共产党人的领导。持各种不同观点的人都劝我放弃这种念头,但没有人试图进行干预。非常明显,考虑到他们所处的特殊环境,在马统工党内几乎不存在任何异端思想,但只要没有加入支持法西斯分子的行列,任何人都不会因政治观点不同而受到处罚。我经常在民兵中慷慨激昂地严厉批判马统工党的“路线”,却从来没因此惹祸上身。我想,对于大多数民兵来说,谁都希望成为一个政党的成员而没有任何压力。我从来没有加入过任何政党,——可在马统工党遭到镇压后,我还是感到极为惋惜。